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Title: The Impact of Religious Bias on Mental Health and Academic Performance: 
Implications for Diversity in Academia and Science Fields 
 
 
Science thrives when there is a continuous flow of new ideas and diverse 
generations of scholars contributing to the field. Although academic institutions aim to 
encourage diverse viewpoints, a culture of atheism among university faculties may 
unwittingly be contributing to an anti-religious atmosphere. The main focus of this 
dissertation is to investigate people’s attitudes toward religious individuals, and how 
these attitudes affect the religious believers’ mental health and academic performance. 
Study 1 (N = 899) found that people tend to explicitly report that religious believers have 
lower intelligence, but to implicitly associate them with higher intelligence. Although this 
is the case, faculty members, particularly those from secular institutions, did not have this 
implicit association and had the strongest congruity between their explicit and implicit 
intelligence preferences. Studies 2-3 showed that religious believers of diverse 
backgrounds reported experiencing overt and covert forms of religious bias, including 
biases related to their academic ability. Religious believers reported that they encountered 
more incidences of overt and covert forms of religious bias inside of higher education 
than outside of academia. Experiences of religious microaggressions significantly 
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predicted higher rates of depression in Study 2 (N = 383) and marginally in Study 3 (N = 
129).  
Finally, Study 4 (N = 169) found that compared to other religious groups, 
Christians were stereotyped to lack science competency. Study 5 (N = 237) demonstrated 
that these stereotypes applied to Christian college students and was at a comparable rate 
to how women are stereotyped to lack scientific competency and interest. Study 6 (N = 
93) demonstrated that these negative stereotypes cause Christian college students to 
become less interested in and identify less with sciences. They also caused Christian 
college students to underperform on science-relevant tasks, especially those students with 
a stronger religious identity (Study 7; N = 90). These studies reveal that stereotypes play 
a key role in pushing religious believers out of science. Implications and future directions 
in the representation of religious believers in academia and science fields are discussed.  
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The United States is a religious country. “In God we trust” appeared on U.S. coins 
as early as 1894, and was adopted as the country’s official motto in 1956. Religiosity is 
often assumed to signal morality and in particular, trustworthiness (Edgell, Gerteis, & 
Hartmann, 2006; Tan & Vogel, 2008). Trust is a valuable form of social capital and an 
important predictor of economic success (Arrow, 1972; Putman, 1993); thus, religious 
individuals may enjoy certain privileges in America. Given that the level of people’s trust 
increases with the religiosity of the trustee (Tan & Vogel, 2008), non-religious 
individuals are disadvantaged in America. 
A growing body of research has begun to document the prejudice that people 
without religious affiliation experience in the United States. These studies show that 
atheists are consistently found to be among the least trusted and liked people in America 
(Gallup, 2012; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 2011; Yancey, 2010). In addition, those 
who identify as having no religious affiliation are perceived to lack morals, even if they 
do not specifically identify as an agnostic or atheist (Gervais et al., 2011; Hood, Spilka, 
Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996). 
However, context is important. Research with religious prejudice suggests that 
while non-religious individuals are disadvantaged in the general American public, 
religious believers, especially Christians, experience prejudice inside the halls of 
academia. Professors and scientists, particularly natural and social science faculty 
members at elite universities, identify as being less religious and more non-religious than 
the general American population (Ecklund & Scheitle, 2007; Gross & Simmons, 2009; 
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Pew Research Center, 2009). Although academic institutions aim to encourage diverse 
viewpoints, a culture of atheism among university faculties may unwittingly be 
contributing to an anti-religious atmosphere. Religious undergraduates’ reports of bias 
rival the levels of racial prejudice reported by minority groups such as African Americans 
(Hyers, 2007; Hyers & Hyers, 2008). Hyers and Hyers (2008) found that these incidents 
ranged from overt forms, such as stereotyping of religious believers as ignorant, and 
professors making derogatory and dismissive remarks about religious individuals, to 
covert forms or general insensitivities toward religion, such as using the Lord’s name in 
vain or other general insensitivities regarding religion.  
Religious believers not only experience prejudice at the undergraduate level, but 
also at the graduate admissions level. Psychology faculty members (n = 356) perceived 
applicants with Christian backgrounds as being less competent and less desirable in the 
graduate school admissions process despite the applicants having identical materials and 
scores (Gartner, 1986). These professors specifically indicated that they had more 
positive feelings and less doubt about the ability of the student with no mention of 
religion on his or her application and were more willing to admit the applicant with no 
mention of religion over the otherwise identical religious applicant. Of those who manage 
to be admitted to graduate school, religious believers report experiencing bias in their 
graduate programs (Hodge, 2006). Religious individuals also experience discrimination 
at the faculty hiring stage (Yancey, 2011), highlighting how academics are willing to 
discriminate against colleagues based on religious and ideological differences (Inbar & 
Lammers, 2012; Yancey, 2011).  
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These findings are consistent with psychological research showing how prejudice 
and stereotypes can negatively affect majority groups depending on the comparison 
group and context. For example, although European American males tend to be a 
privileged group in the US, they can nevertheless experience and suffer from negative 
beliefs about their group. European American men have been shown to underperform on 
tasks described to measure athletic ability when compared to African Americans because 
of the stereotype that African Americans have greater athletic aptitude (Stone, Lynch, 
Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999). European American men who are told that Asian Americans 
perform better in mathematics (Aronson, Lustina, Good, Keough, Steele, & Brown, 
1999) underperform when compared to men not given this same threatening information. 
These studies show the negative effects stereotypes can have on majority groups who are 
not generally stigmatized in society. These studies also highlight how a minority group 
can experience “positive” stereotypes, which can negatively affect a majority group 
(European American men), although positive stereotypes about minority groups can also 
negatively affect these groups in some cases (e.g., the “model minority” myth of Asian 
Americans; Kim & Lee, 2014). 
Ideological Diversity 
Psychology has long been a field that values diversity. Most of the research has 
focused on demographic diversity (e.g., ethnicity, gender), and, until recently, only 
limited attention has been paid to ideological diversity. At the 2011 Society of Social 
Psychology and Personality (SPSP)’s annual conference, Jonathan Haidt asked his 
audience of about 1,000 attendees to raise their hands to identify their political 
affiliations. Three hands were counted for being “conservative or on the right,” 12 for 
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“libertarians,” and 20 for “moderate or centrist.” A large majority (roughly 80 percent of 
the audience) identified as liberal. Haidt concluded that given the diversity of political 
beliefs in America, this was statistically impossible if the audience was representative of 
the American population.  
Following this, Inbar and Lammers (2012) surveyed members of SPSP to 
examine the political diversity of social psychologists, and how discrimination and bias 
may affect the political representation of psychologists. Inbar and Lammers (2012) found 
a political representation reflective of Haidt’s audience where 85% of participants 
identified as a liberal, nine percent as a moderate, and six percent as a conservative. In 
addition, Inbar and Lammers (2012) found that 82% of those who identified as a 
conservative reported experiencing a hostile climate towards their political beliefs despite 
liberals’ tendency to report that they do not perceive a hostile climate towards 
conservatives. Conservatives’ concerns were consistent with the reported attitudes of 
participants who identified as liberals; 82% of liberals indicated that they would be 
biased against a conservative when hiring a faculty job candidate and when reviewing the 
grant application of a known conservative; 78% indicated bias in reviewing a paper of a 
conservative author and 56% indicated hesitancy in inviting a conservative colleague to 
be part of a conference symposium (Duarte et al., 2015; Inbar & Lammers, 2012). In 
addition, the more liberal participants identified themselves, the more likely they reported 
a willingness to be biased against a conservative (despite that being more liberal is related 
to being more likely to report that they perceive there to be less of a hostile environment 
for conservatives). As success in academia depends on grant funding, journal 
publications and presentations, and tenure hiring and promotion, Inbar and Lammers 
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(2012) highlight how discrimination and bias are playing a key role in the lack of 
political diversity of Psychology.  
Science thrives when there is a continuous flow of new ideas and diverse 
generations of scholars contributing to the field. Studies show that people learn better in 
racially heterogeneous academic environments, and that exposure to new perspectives 
and beliefs helps people to develop more complex thinking skills (Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, 
& Downing, 2003; Gurin, Dey, Hurtado, & Gurin, 2002). Groups composed of members 
with different perspectives and knowledge make higher quality decisions and perform 
better (Argote, Gruenfeld, & Naquin, 2000; Homan, van Knippenberg, Van Kleef & De 
Dreu, 2007). Because scientists tend to come from similar educational, socioeconomic, 
and religious (i.e., non-religious or religiously liberal) backgrounds (Ecklund & Scheitle, 
2007), the need to obtain different perspectives is especially critical. 
Not only does ideological diversity lead to better science, but researchers argue 
that the opposite can also be true. Established psychological research shows that people 
are susceptible to confirmation bias and groupthink, which can lead to unfairness (Janis, 
1992; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, & Moscovici, 2000). For example, in the peer-
review publication process, researchers may be more likely to criticize findings that 
contradict their beliefs and to be more methodologically permissive of findings that are 
congruent with their values and viewpoints, compromising and hindering the objective 
nature of science (Duarte et al., 2015). Duarte and colleagues (2015), and Inbar & 
Lammers (2012) argue that the credibility of science is damaged by researchers whose 
ideological stances and values color the questions they ask and the interpretations they 
conclude with their data. In the field of Psychology, Duarte and colleagues (2015) 
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highlight how liberal values and assumptions have 1) biased researchers’ operant 
definitions, leading to misguided findings and conclusions, and 2) deterred researchers 
from examining topics that may contradict the prevailing liberal narrative. 
In response to Duarte and colleagues (2015), some researchers have argued that 
ideological diversity should not just be limited to political diversity, but also include 
religious diversity (Motyl & Iyer, 2015). Motyl and Iyer (2015) highlighted similarities in 
the generally negative narratives in Psychology about conservatives and religious 
believers (and the generally positive narratives about liberals and atheists), demonstrating 
how political conservatives and religious groups may face similarly hostile environments 
and assumptions that deter them from entering academia and the sciences. In addition, 
Crawford and colleagues (2015) argued that given the relationship between religiosity 
and political orientation, addressing one could lead to greater representation in the other. 
Although this may be the case, there has been limited research systematically examining 
religious prejudice and the impact it has on the representation of believers in academia 
and science.  
Purpose and Aim of Dissertation 
Therefore, the main focus of my dissertation is to investigate the stereotypes and 
prejudices experienced by religious individuals and how they affect the mental health and 
academic performance of these individuals. I am also interested in examining how 
context, in particular, exposure to and experience within academia, affects religious 
prejudice and religious believers’ experience with bias. Religious bias in academia 
threatens to disadvantage religious students and to discourage them from joining the 
academy, which perpetuates the cycle of exclusion and limits diversity in academia. My 
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dissertation research will have three main objectives and is divided into three research 
phases. The first goal is to examine people’s attitudes and beliefs about religious 
believers, the second is to investigate how these attitudes affect the mental health and 
academic performance of these individuals, and the third is to understand how the 
academic context influences the development, experience, and impact of religious 
prejudice.  
To accomplish the first purpose, I use various psychological methods in the three 
research phases to understand people’s perceptions and attitudes towards religious 
believers. I will examine explicit versus implicit attitudes in Phase I, subtle versus overt 
religious prejudice in Phase II, and societal versus personal religious stereotypes in Phase 
III. This diversity in measurement allows for a more comprehensive investigation of 
people’s attitudes towards religious believers. Starting in Phase II, I examine how 
religious prejudice impacts believers’ mental health and well-being. Finally, in Phase III, 
I investigate how religious stereotypes impact believers’ academic performance. The 
three research phases take into consideration the academic context and aim to increase 
knowledge and awareness of religious bias inside and outside of academia. 
“Religious believers” is a broad category, and thus, it is important to define the 
population I am studying for my dissertation. Religious believers consist of many faith 
groups including those who identify as Buddhists, Christians, Jews, Hindus, and 
Muslims. Although they typically share the commonality of believing in the existence of 
a God or gods or following a particular religious leader/set of beliefs, Christians differ 
from other religious groups in that they are part of the majority group in America.   
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Past studies examining the prevalence of religious bias in academia have included 
mainly Christian participants (Gartner, 1986; Hodge, 2006; Hyers & Hyers, 2008). 
Because of this, it is not clear whether religious bias in academia is unique to Christians 
or whether anyone who has a belief in the existence of a God or gods (i.e. theists) or 
identifies with a religion experiences prejudice in academia. For my dissertation, I will 
expand beyond Christians to include religious individuals of different faith traditions to 
better understand religious bias in academia. Nonetheless, some of my dissertation 
research will solely focus on Christians to better target the specific stereotypes and 
prejudices they experience.  
Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Below are the main research questions and hypotheses (H) for each dissertation 
research phase.  
Phase I (Study 1). What are people’s explicit and implicit associations between 
religiosity and intelligence?  Do these attitudes differ depending on one’s academic 
affiliation and exposure?  
H1.1 University Differences: Participants from secular universities will explicitly 
and implicitly associate believers with lower intelligence than participants from 
religious universities.  
H1.2 Discipline Differences: People from the life sciences will explicitly and 
implicitly view believers to be less intelligent than those from the non-life 
sciences.           
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H1.3 Academic Sample Differences: Faculty members will explicitly and 
implicitly associate believers with lower intelligence than university students and 
community members.   
Phase II (Studies 2-3). How are people’s negative attitudes about religious 
individuals expressed? How do these biases impact religious individuals’ mental health? 
Do people’s experiences of subtle and overt forms of religious bias differ depending on 
the academic context?  
H2.1 Mental Health Outcomes: Experiences of religious bias will be associated 
with poorer mental health outcomes for religious individuals.  
H2.2 Rates of Microaggressions: Students will experience higher levels of 
religious bias than non-students. People will experience higher levels of religious 
bias inside of academia than outside of academia. 
Phase III (Studies 4-7). What are the societal and personal stereotypes regarding 
religious individuals’ academic and scientific competence?  How do these stereotypes 
impact the academic performance of religious individuals?  
H3.1 Cultural versus Personal Stereotypes: Participants will indicate that 
Christian and female students are culturally stereotyped as being less interested, 
performing worse, and being less competent in the sciences, and atheist and male 
students are stereotyped as being more interested, performing better and being 
more competent in the sciences than an average college student. Non-Christians 
will indicate that they personally believe in these cultural stereotypes for Christian 
college students in the domain of science, general intelligence, and general 
competence, but not for female students.  
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H3.2 Science Identifications and Performance: I predict that compared to non-
Christians, Christians in a stereotype threat condition will identify less with 
science and have lower performance on science-related tasks. 
This dissertation contains published and unpublished co-authored materials from 
Cheng, Pagano, and Shariff (in press) and Rios, Cheng, Totten, and Shariff (2015). 
Background materials and studies related to microaggressions are taken from Cheng et al. 
(in press), and appear in Chapters I, III and V. Stereotype threat studies and background 
information are taken from Rios et al. (2015) and are included in Chapters I, VI, and V. 
More information about the contributions of each author is located at the beginning of 





STUDY 1: EXPLICIT AND IMPLICIT ATTITUDES ASSOCIATED WITH 
RELIGION AND INTELLIGENCE  
Introduction 
There have been numerous studies examining the relationship between religiosity 
and intelligence, but what are people’s actual perceptions about the intelligence of 
religious believers? In a recent meta-analysis of 63 studies, Zuckerman and colleagues 
(2013) found a negative correlation (r = -.16) between religiosity and performance on 
various intelligence measures (Zuckerman, Silverman, & Hall, 2013). Prior to this work, 
Lynn and colleagues (2009) found that atheists tend to score higher on IQ tests than 
theists, and that disbelief in God is positively correlated with national IQ in 137 countries 
(Lynn, Harvey, & Nyborg, 2009). Aside from IQ performance differences, Lynn and 
colleagues (2009) argued that additional evidence for the negative relationship between 
religiosity and intelligence includes 1) lower rates of religious beliefs among scholars and 
scientists compared to the general population, 2) a decrease in religious belief as children 
advance into late adolescence during which there is a simultaneous increase in cognitive 
ability, and 3) a general decline in religious belief among the college and general 
population as the intelligence level of populations has increased in the last century (Lynn 
et al., 2009).  
 Zuckerman and colleagues (2013) proposed that religious believers perform more 
poorly on IQ measures because intelligence and cognitive measures require more 
analytical thinking. Shenhav and colleagues (2012) found that those who engage in 
intuitive thinking tend to be more religious; they also found that using intuitive thinking 
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when solving problems positively predicts the strength of people’s belief in God, and that 
experimentally inducing an intuitive mindset increases reported belief in God (Shenhav et 
al., 2012). Analytical thinking style, on the other hand, negatively predicts religious 
beliefs, in that those who engage in more analytical thinking report lower supernatural 
beliefs (Pennycook et al., 2012). Experimentally priming analytical thinking increases 
religious disbelief (Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012), although the opposite effect has not 
been found (i.e., religious beliefs have not been shown to suppress analytical thinking nor 
increase intuitive thinking). Because standardized tests such as the SAT and GRE require 
and test for analytical thinking, religious believers may be disadvantaged on these tests 
that influence access to higher education. Lower intelligence is strongly associated with 
religious fundamentalism and modestly associated with other dimensions of religiosity 
(Lewis, Ritchie, & Bates, 2011); thus poor intelligence performance may more strongly 
influence one segment (i.e., fundamentalists) of the religious population over another.  
Even though there is a negative relationship between religion and intelligence 
performance, Zuckerman and colleagues (2013) did not find that there was a negative 
relationship between religiosity and GPA. This may be because, aside from intelligence, 
conscientiousness is the most important factor influencing academic attainment and 
achievement (Charlton, 2009). In a meta-analysis of religiosity and personality, Saroglou 
(2002) showed that religious individuals have higher levels of the personality trait 
conscientiousness than non-religious individuals (r = .18). Religion is shown to both 
enhance and replenish people’s abilities to have self-control (Rounding, Lee, Jacobson & 
Li, 2011). Self-control and conscientiousness are predictive of a variety of positive 
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outcomes such as delayed gratification, better group performance and cooperation, and 
science achievement (Eilam, Zeidner, & Aharon, 2009; Rounding et al., 2011).  
Although there have been numerous studies examining the relationship between 
religiosity and intelligence, there have been limited studies examining people’s actual 
attitudes about the intellectual abilities of religious individuals. A large proportion of the 
American population identifies as being religious or having a belief in God (Gallup, 
2016); thus, it is possible that they may hold more positive views about their own or other 
religious believers’ intellectual ability due to in-group bias. On the other hand, because 
there is a lower rate of religiosity among faculty members and scientists (Ecklund & 
Scheitle, 2007; Gross & Simmons, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2009), scholars may 
perceive religious believers to have lower intelligence.  
This is an important topic as studies have shown that people’s beliefs about the 
intellectual ability of a group can affect performance. For example, telling female 
students that math abilities are genetically determined leads to poorer performance 
compared to women who are told that math ability is malleable (Dar-Nimrod & Heine, 
2006). Even merely mentioning that intelligence is being measured can cause negatively 
stereotyped groups to perform poorly on tests (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Prior studies 
have also highlighted how teachers’ expectations affect students’ performance and 
motivation (Ferguson, 2003). In addition, people’s negative attitudes about a group can 
lead to biased actions (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). Because 
people’s beliefs about the intellectual ability of a group can affect performance, it is 
important to investigate people’s attitudes about the intelligence level of believers. It is 
also important to examine educators’ beliefs about the intelligence of believers as their 
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attitudes may unconsciously affect their treatment of students.  
In addition, because people tend to underreport or want to conceal biases that may 
be socially undesirable, it is important to go beyond self-report measures. The Implicit 
Association Task (IAT) is one such method and is commonly used to measure people’s 
implicit associations (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). The IAT is a well-validated 
psychological tool that uses participants’ reaction times to measure implicit associations. 
The IAT measures the strength of association between two constructs relative to one 
another. For example, the “Good-Bad Insect versus Flowers” IAT can measure how 
people have stronger associations between “Flowers-Good” and “Insect-Bad” pairings 
relative to “Flowers-Bad” and “Insect-Good” pairings. If people have stronger 
associations between Flowers-Good or between Insect-Bad (or both), they would be 
quicker to sort the words associated with Flowers (e.g., Roses) and Good (e.g., beautiful) 
when these two constructs are paired together. Overall, examining people’s both explicit 
and implicit attitude about religious believers’ intelligence is important and may have 
consequences for believers’ academic performance. 
Method 
Participants 
The sample consisted of 899 participants and was somewhat equal among genders 
(56.6% female, 43.4% male) with a mean age of 31.13 (SD = 12.77) years. It was also 
predominantly European American (71% European American, 8.6% Latino American, 
6.2% African American, 5.2% multiracial, 3.9% Asian American). A little over half 
identified with a religion (52.9%) while 35.7% did not. The religiously-affiliated 
participants consisted mainly of Protestant Christians (27.5%) and Catholic Christians 
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(17.2%), while the non-religiously affiliated participants consisted of Agnostics (19.9%) 
and Atheists (15.3%). I recruited participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk) 
and from four comparable institutions of higher education. The higher education 
institutions were chosen based on two dimensions: location in states that differ in both 
political orientation and in religiosity (two Oregon versus two Texas universities) and 
religious affiliation (two secular versus two private Christian universities). These college 
samples allowed me to detect differences across both religiously affiliated and non-
religiously affiliated universities and across different academic disciplines. Combining all 
these groups, the final sample consisted of 433 community members, 366 undergraduate 
and graduate students, and 74 faculty members (26 missing).  
Measures 
Explicit attitude. Using the Attitude Thermometer (Yancey, 2010), participants 
rated the intellectual ability of religious believers and atheists on a scale of 0 to 100 with 
higher ratings indicating greater intelligence. 
Implicit attitude. Because people tend to underreport or conceal their biases, the 
use of the self-report Attitude Thermometer was supplemented with the Implicit 
Association Task (IAT; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). For Study 1, I had participants 
categorize words associated with each construct to examine how they associated Theists 
(versus Atheists) with Intelligence (versus Unintelligence). Stimulus words used in the 
IAT were derived from a pilot study in which mTurk participants (n = 22) rated a list of 
synonyms for the construct categories (theist, atheist, intelligent, unintelligent). The five 
highest rated words from each category were used in the IAT (see Appendix A). I used 
“Millisecond” software to program and conduct the IAT.  
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The IAT score (the d score) ranges from -1 to 1 and was calculated so that it 
measured the strength of participants’ reaction times on “Theist-Intelligence” and 
“Atheist-Unintelligence” pairings relative to “Atheist-Intelligence” and “Theist-
Unintelligent” pairings (see Figure 1). Thus, participants holding stronger associations 
between Theist-Intelligence or between Atheist-Unintelligence (or both) would be 
quicker to sort the words associated with the categories Theist (e.g., believer) and 
intelligence (e.g., smart) when these two constructs are paired together and have a 
positive d score. The closer the d value is to 1, the stronger the association between 
Theist-Intelligence (or Atheist-Unintelligence).  
Figure 1. Example of the Implicit Association Task. 
 
Religiosity and demographics. Other dependent measures included an 




 General results. Using one sample t-tests comparing people’s ratings to the 
midpoint of the scale (i.e., 50), I found that participants rated all target groups [i.e., 
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atheist, agnostic, spiritual but not religious (SBNR), and religious believer] to be above 
the midpoint in intelligence (all p’s < .001). Using multiple paired t-tests, I found that the 
intelligence ratings of the target decreased with the religiosity of the target. Participants 
rated the atheist target (M = 71.12, SD = 19.93) to be more intelligent than the agnostic 
target (M = 69.16, SD = 18.15; t(898)=3.45, p < .001); the agnostic target to be more 
intelligent than the SBNR target (M = 65.71, SD = 19.35; t(898) = 4.96, p < .001); and 
the SBNR target more intelligent than the religious believer target (M = 57.50, SD = 
20.95; t(898) = 10.45, p < .001). 
Religious versus secular universities. Because I was interested in examining 
how academia impacts the intellectual rating of the targets, I examined how university 
religious affiliation, study discipline, and academic exposure affected participants’ 
perception of the intelligence of the targets. For all these analyses, I controlled for 
participants’ intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity. For religious affiliation, I found no significant 
main effect of the religiosity of the target, but there was a significant interaction between 
the religiosity of the target and the religious affiliation of the school. This suggests that 
participants from religious and secular academic institutions are rating the intelligence 
level of the different targets differently, F(2.46, 785.45) = 8.51, p < .001. The partial eta 
squared (np2 = .03) was of small size (np2 = .01 is small; np2 = .06 is medium, and np2 = .14 is 
large). 
Using pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction, I found that participants 
from secular institutions perceived all non-religious target groups to have higher 
intelligence than the religious target (all ps < .001), while participants from religiously 
affiliated universities only perceived the atheist target to have significantly higher 
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intelligence than the religious believer target (p = .02). I also compared how participants 
from secular versus religiously-affiliated universities rated each target, and found that 
participants from secular universities rated the agnostic target to have higher intelligence 
(p = .03) and the religious believer target to have lower intelligence (p = .004) than those 
from religiously affiliated universities (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Explicit intelligence ratings by religious and non-religiously affiliated 
university participants.  
 
Academic disciplines. I divided the student and faculty participants into 
humanities, social sciences and life/hard sciences to examine the effect of academic 
disciplines on intelligence ratings. I found a significant main effect of the religiosity of 
the target, F(2.45, 995.23) = 4.61, p < .01, np2 = .01. Using simple within-subject 

























intelligence than the religious target (all p’s < .01, np2= .01- .03). There was no interaction 
between the religiosity of target and academic discipline. 
Academic exposure. Since I was interested in seeing whether academic exposure 
would affect intellectual ratings, I divided the sample into faculty (i.e., longest exposure 
to academia), students (who are in an academic setting) and community members. I 
found a significant main effect of the religiosity of the target in which participants’ 
intelligence ratings differed by the religiosity of the target, F(2.36, 2050.57) = 16.70, p < 
.001, np2 = .02. Using simple within-subjects contrasts, I again found that participants 
rated all the non-religious targets to have higher intelligence than the religious target (all 
p’s < .001, np2= .03- .04). There was also a significant interaction between the religiosity 
of the target and academic exposure of participants, suggesting community versus student 
versus faculty rated the intelligence level of the different targets differently, F(4.72, 
2050.57) = 4.50, p < .001, np2 = .01.  
Using pairwise comparison test with Bonferroni corrections, I found both the 
community and student participants rated each of the non-religious targets to have higher 
intelligence than the religious target (all p < .001). Faculty showed a similar trend in 
which they also rated the atheist and agnostic targets as having higher intelligence than 
the religious target (p’s < .001); however, their rating of the SBNR target was not 
significantly different from the religious target  (p > .21). When examining how each 
group rated the targets differently, I found that faculty gave the SBNR target a lower 
intelligent rating compared to community participants (p = .002) and students (marginal 
significance: p = .07), but there were no significant differences among the community, 
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students and faculty in how they rated the atheist, agnostic and religious believer targets 
(see Figure 3). 
Figure 3. Explicit intelligence ratings divided by academic exposure.  
 
Implicit Attitudes 
Group differences.  
Religious versus secular universities. Using univariate ANCOVA controlling for 
participants’ intrinsic/extrinsic religiosity, I found participants from religiously affiliated 
universities had significantly stronger implicit associations between theists and 
intelligence than non-religious participants, F(1,320) = -11.06, p < .001, np2 = .03 (see 
Table 1 for d values).  
Academic disciplines. I found no differences among the disciplines for the 

























Community participants versus students versus faculty. There was a significant 
main effect of academic exposure, F(2, 873)= 10.10, p < .001, np2 = .02. Simple effects 
tests with faculty as the comparison group showed that both community members and 
students had a significantly stronger positive associations between theists and intelligence 
compared to faculty (p’s < .001).  
Preferences 
Implicit preferences. Using one sample t-tests, I compared participants’ d scores 
against 0, which would indicate whether people were more likely to associate theist with 
intelligence (or atheist with unintelligence) or theist with unintelligence (or atheist with 
intelligence). In contrast to what I found for participants’ explicit intelligence ratings, the 
majority of groups implicitly associated theists with intelligence. One of the exceptions 
was that some faculty groups had no preference for either association (see Table 1 for a 
summary of all d score comparisons against 0 for all interested sample groups).  
Implicit and explicit preferences correlations. Because of the discrepancy 
between participants’ explicit and implicit associations between religion and intelligence, 
I examined the strength of the correlation between these two attitudes. To compute an 
explicit attitude preference score that was more parallel to the d score for implicit 
attitudes, I calculated participants’ explicit intelligence preference by subtracting their 
intelligence ratings of the atheist from the intelligence rating of the religious believer. 
Thus, a negative number indicates that the participant holds the explicit attitude that 
atheists have a higher level of intelligence than religious believers. Using one sample t-
tests, I compared participants’ explicit intelligence preference against 0 and found that all 
groups are explicitly indicating that they believe religious believers to have lower 
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intelligence than atheists. When examining the relationship between participants’ explicit 
and implicit intelligence preferences, in general, I found a significant correlation for all 
but one group: faculty. They fell on the extremes where religiously affiliated university 
faculty had no significant correlation between their implicit and explicit intelligence 
preference, while faculty members at secular universities had the strongest correlation 
(see Table 1).  
Table 1 
Implicit and Explicit Intelligence Preferences and Correlations 
Note. Means (and standard deviation) of d scores and for the explicit intelligence 
preferences are reported. Symbols indicate significance levels († at p < .10, * at p < .05, 
** at p < .01, *** at p < .001). 
Discussion 
 The main purpose of Study 1 was to examine people’s explicit and implicit 
associations between intelligence and the religiosity of individuals. I was also particularly 
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these associations. Looking across all participants, participants typically explicitly 
reported that people’s intelligence level decreases with higher religiosity and reported 
that religious believers had lower intelligence levels compared to atheists. In terms of 
group differences, faculty and students from secular universities were significantly more 
likely than those from religiously affiliated university to associate people with higher 
religiosity with lower intelligence.  
There were no differences across disciplines for explicit ratings of intelligence. 
There were similarities in how faculty, students, and community members rated the 
intelligence level of targets except for the SBNR target. Faculty members were 
significantly more likely than students and community members to rate the SBNR target 
as having lower intelligence and made no distinction between the intelligence level of 
SBNR and religious believers. 
 For implicit attitudes, participants generally associated intelligence with those 
who believe in God (theists), although the strengths of these associations varied 
depending on the academic affiliation and exposure of individuals. Faculty and students 
from secular institutions were less likely than those from religiously affiliated universities 
to associate theists with intelligence. In addition, faculty members were significantly less 
likely than students and community members to implicitly associate theists with 
intelligence. Although most participants implicitly associated theists with intelligence, 
faculty members from secular institutions did not. They equally associated theists and 
atheists with intelligence, showing no implicit preference for one or the other.  
 Overall, participants’ explicit and implicit attitudes appear to contradict one 
another although they are generally significantly correlated with one another. While all 
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groups explicitly report perceiving religious believers to have lower intelligence 
compared to atheists, they are more likely to implicitly associate believers with 
intelligence than they to implicitly associate atheists with intelligence. A meta-analysis of 
126 studies found an effect size of 0.24 between explicit self-report measures and the 
IAT, suggesting a small correlation between people’s explicit and implicit attitudes 
(Hoffman, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). In addition, other prior 
studies have found discrepancies between implicit and explicit attitudes (e.g., Olson, 
Fazio & Hermann, 2007; Soo Hing, Chung-Yan, Grunfeld, Robichaud, & Zanna, 2005). 
While some researchers have proposed that the discrepancy between explicit and implicit 
scores implies ambivalence or conflicting evaluations, Smith and Nosek (2012) found 
that the explicit-implicit discrepancy is not related to ambivalence measures nor does it 
predict ambivalence-related outcomes.  
Rather, studies have shown that the IAT may simply reflect societal, cultural 
and/or extrapersonal associations instead of personal beliefs (Han, Czellar, Olsen, & 
Fazio, 2010; Karpinski & Hilton, 2001). Thus, the finding that people implicitly associate 
religion with intelligence may be reflective of a halo effect of religion or a reverse halo 
effect of atheism. In America, religiosity is often assumed to signal morality and, in 
particular, trustworthiness (Edgell et al., 2006; Tan & Vogel, 2008).  Therefore, because 
religion tends to be associated with positive traits in the American culture, people  
implicitly associate intelligence with religion, suggesting a halo effect of religion.  
As the IAT’s d score is reflective of different associations (i.e., a positive d score 
can be the association between religion with intelligence and/or atheism with 
unintelligence), it is also possible that people’s implicit associations reflect the negative 
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connotation of atheism/non-religiosity. Prior studies show that atheists are among the 
least trusted and liked people in America (Gallup, 2012; Gervais, Shariff, & Norenzayan, 
2011; Yancey, 2010), and those who identify as having no religious affiliation are 
perceived to lack morals, even if they do not specifically identify as agnostic or atheist 
(Hood, Spilka, Hunsberger & Gorsuch, 1996). Therefore, it is possible that people’s 
implicit association between religion and intelligence is due to the reverse halo effect of 
atheism, and/or a combination of both the halo and reverse halo effect.  
 Although religion may have a positive association in the general American 
culture, academia may reflect different values. The implicit data shows that participants 
from secular institutions were significantly less likely than those from religiously 
affiliated universities to associate theists with intelligence. Faculty members also were 
significantly less likely than students and community members to associate theists with 
intelligence. As universities tend to be more secular with professors being less religious 
and more non-religious than the general American population (Gross & Simmons, 2009; 
Pew Research Center, 2009), it is no surprise to see a decrease in the association between 
religion and intelligence. In addition, faculty members from secular institutions had no 
implicit intelligence preference for theists or atheists and had the strongest congruity 
between their explicit and implicit intelligence preferences. This may be explained by 
faculty members having the longest exposure to academia and being more insulated from 
the halo effect of religion and being more exposed to anti-religious messages. Faculty 
members at religiously affiliated universities showed no significant correlation between 
their explicit and implicit intelligence preference. This may reflect the opposing effect 
that exposure to academia and being embedded in a religious context may have on one 
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another. Overall, group differences found in the implicit ratings and in the correlation 
between explicit and implicit intelligence preference correlations suggest that the implicit 
data measures more societal associations than personal beliefs.  
Future Direction and Next Phase 
While participants’ implicit associations may reflect cultural associations and the 
effect sizes are small, prior studies show that they have predictive validity; thus, it is 
important to investigate how people’s explicit and implicit associations may affect their 
behaviors. In a meta-analysis of 122 studies, Greenwald and colleagues (2009) found that 
people’s IAT scores have r = .27 for behavioral predictability, while explicit measures 
have a predictive validity of r = .36 (Greenwald et al., 2009). Although self-report 
measures tend to have higher predictive validity, Greenwald and colleagues (2009) found 
that explicit and implicit attitudes have incremental validity, suggesting that they have 
predictive power that is independent of one another.   
 Because both explicit and implicit attitudes have predictive power, it is unclear 
how the discrepancy found between participants’ explicit and implicit attitudes would 
impact their behavior towards religious and non-religious individuals. Are religious 
individuals more likely to receive explicit forms of bias than more subtle forms? Are 
religious individuals more shielded from bias in the general American public because of 
the halo effect of religion and the reverse halo effect of atheism? Is academia still a safe 
haven for non-believers as people’s implicit preferences may affect non-religious 
individuals negatively? While these are all important questions to examine, I will focus 
on the first two questions in the next research phase to see how religious individuals 
perceive and experience religious bias inside and outside of academia. Specifically, I will 
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examine whether religious prejudice is communicated in the form of microaggressions 
versus overt discrimination, and if there are differences in rates religious prejudice 





STUDIES 2-3: RELIGIOUS MICROAGGRESSIONS, DISCRIMINATION AND 
MENTAL HEALTH OUTCOMES 
 
This chapter contains materials from: 
Cheng, Z.H, Pagano, L. & Shariff, A. (in press). The development and validation 
of Microaggressions Against Religious Individuals Scale (MARIS). Psychology of 
Religion and Spirituality.  
Azim Shariff was the principal investigator for the studies. Louis Pagano helped 
in conducting the data analysis to develop the microaggressions scale (MARIS). I 
primarily conducted the data analysis and the writings included in this chapter.   
 
Introduction 
Microaggressions are subtle and commonplace remarks or actions that people 
may experience as demeaning, prejudicial, and negating (Sue, Capodilupo et al., 2007). 
The theory of microaggressions—first proposed by Pierce, Carew, Pierce-Gonzalez, and 
Wills (1977)—was further developed by Sue (Sue, Capodilupo et al., 2007; Sue, 2010a; 
Sue, 2010b), and it is an emerging area of inquiry in the psychology of prejudice. 
Because early research on microaggressions focused on race, there are several developed 
racial microaggressions scales and taxonomies developed for ethnic minorities (e.g. 
Nadal, 2011; Torres-Harding, Andrade & Romero-Diaz, 2012). Examples of racial 
microaggressions include complimenting Asian Americans on their English fluency or 
complimenting African Americans on how articulate they sound (Tran & Lee, 2014). 
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While these questions and comments may be well intended, the messages that are 
communicated (i.e., you are a foreigner or should be less intelligent because of your race) 
are prejudicial. 
In addition to general racial microaggressions scales, microaggressions themes 
and measures have been developed for specific racial groups such as African Americans, 
Asian Americans, and Hispanic Americans in order to highlight the unique forms of 
microaggressions that these racial groups experience (Constantine & Sue, 2007; Ong, 
Burrow, Fuller-Rowell, Ja & Sue, 2013; Sue, Capodilupo et al., 2007; 2008).  
Researchers have also examined other forms of microaggressions, including those 
experienced by women and sexual minorities (e.g., Balsam, Molina, Beadnell, Simoni, & 
Walters, 2011; Capodilupo, Nadal, Corman, Hamit, Lyons, & Weinberg, 2010; Nadal, 
Issa, Leon, Meterko, Wideman & Wong, 2011). 
To date, only one study has examined religious microaggressions (Nadal, Griffin, 
Hamit, Leon, Tobio, & Rivera, 2012). Nadal and colleagues (2012) conducted a 
qualitative study on Muslim Americans’ experiences with microaggressions. However, 
because this study was small (n = 10) and only focused on a single group, a more 
extensive examination of religious microaggressions is needed. Nadal and colleagues 
(2010) also proposed that religious minorities may encounter higher rates of 
microaggressions than Christians as they are also more likely to experience religious 
discrimination (Nadal, Issa, Griffin, Hamit & Lyons, 2010). However, prior research 
shows that, in certain contexts, Christians can encounter as much bias as other minority 
groups—or even more than other groups (e.g., Gartner, 1986; Hyers & Hyers, 2008; 
Yancey, 2011). Therefore, more research is needed to understand how religious minority 
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groups experience microaggressions compared to majority groups. Overall, religious 
microaggressions research would benefit from a more extensive examination with a 
larger sample size including different religious groups.  
Microaggressions differ from overt discrimination in that they tend to occur more 
frequently and in everyday interactions (Nadal, 2011). Thus, studying religious 
microaggressions in addition to overt discrimination can provide a more holistic picture 
of how religious individuals experience prejudice. Moreover, prior research has found 
that people experience greater cognitive impairments when encountering ambiguous 
prejudice than overt racism (Salvatore & Shelton, 2007). Similarly, microaggressions 
theorists propose that although microaggressions are subtler forms of prejudice, their 
frequency can create a negative cumulative psychological effect—“death by a thousand 
cuts” (Nadal et al., 2011).  
Indeed, Nadal and colleagues (2014) found that experiences of racial 
microaggressions predicted greater depressive symptoms (Nadal, Griffin, Wong, Hamit, 
& Rasmus, 2014), and Torres and colleagues (2010) found that experiences of 
microaggressions were related to greater perceived stress at one-year follow-up (Torres, 
Driscoll, & Burrow, 2010). However, these studies do not measure or control for 
discrimination. Because prior meta-analyses have found discrimination to have a small 
but significant negative relationship (r = -.17 to -.22) with mental health (e.g., depressive 
symptoms) and general well being (e.g., perceived stress; Pascoe & Smart Richman, 
2009), it is unclear whether microaggressions independently predict poorer mental health. 
Thus, it is important to examine subtle acts of prejudice like microaggressions alongside 
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Inclusion Criteria and Participants. Participants were those who self-identified 
as being religious and reported a belief in a God or god(s) or followed a particular 
religious figure (e.g., Buddha). In an effort to recruit a religiously diverse sample, I 
recruited participants via Qualtrics Panel. The sample of 383 participants was 
predominantly female (74.2%) with an average age of 24.71 years. About half of the 
participants were Christian (53.5%), with the others being 12.5% Buddhist, 10.4% 
Muslim, 9.9% Hindu, 8.4% Jewish, and 5.2% other. The majority of Christians consisted 
of Catholics (36.2%), those without a denomination (20.6%), and Baptists (20.1%). Of 
those who identified as Muslims, the majority (81.1%) identified with the Sunni 
denomination, 10.8% with the Shiite denomination, and 2.7% with the Sufi 
denomination. The sample was ethnically diverse with 48.2% European American, 22.7% 
Asian American, Hawaiian or Pacific Islander, 11.5% African American, 8.4% Hispanic 
American, 3.4% Middle Easterner, 2.6% American Indian or Alaskan Native, 2.3% other, 
and 1% chose not to answer. More than half of the participants were current college and 
post-college students (61.6%). 
Measures.  
Microaggressions Against Religious Individual Scale (MARIS). MARIS is a 
three-factor (Assumption of Inferiority, Religious Stereotyping, and Assumption of Non-
religiosity) 10-item scale that measures microaggressions experienced by religious 
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individuals (Cheng, Pagano, & Shariff, in press; see Appendix). The Assumption of 
Inferiority factor (α = .90) contains four items that measure religious individuals’ 
experiences with other people assuming that the religious individuals are less educated, 
competent, or successful because of their religion. My colleagues and I (Cheng et al., in 
press) found that the subscale Assumption of Inferiority explained the greatest variance in 
the MARIS. 
The Religious Stereotypes factor (α = .89) includes three items that measure the 
extent to which people assume religious individuals are close-minded and judgmental 
toward various groups. The Assumption of Non-religiosity factor (α = .85) contains 
microaggressive items measuring the extent to which people wrongly assume that 
religious individuals do not believe in God(s) or attend places of worship. The overall 
scale has a high level of internal consistency (α = .93), variance, and construct validity 
(Cheng et al., in press). Participants in this study indicated how often they experienced 
these microaggressions items inside and outside of an academic setting during a typical 
school year using the following scale: 1 = Never, 2 = 1-3 times, 3 = 4-6 times, 4 = 7-9 
times, 5 = 10 or more times.  
General Religious Discriminatory Scale (GRDS). I adapted the original 14-item 
general discriminatory scale from Sheridan (2006), which explored Muslims’ 
discriminatory experiences (N = 222), to be used for multiple religious groups. The 
original 14-item scale demonstrated a strong internal consistency (above .90) and was 
validated using the General Health Questionnaire-12, a measure of overall mental health. 
Our modified scale (α = .94) contained scale items that measure the direct experience or 
observation of religious discrimination in three ways: (a) observing negative stereotypes 
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of one’s religious group in the media, (b) witnessing prejudiced political and violent 
activities toward religious individuals, and (c) seeing religious discrimination or 
prejudice. Respondents identified the frequency of these experiences with responses 
ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (very often).   
Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale-Revised.  The Center for 
Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale- Revised (CESD-R) is a 20-item scale used to 
evaluate symptoms associated with a major depressive episode. Symptom incidence is 
evaluated on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = not at all or less than one day; 5 = 5-7 days or 
nearly every day for 2 weeks). The original scale had a high level of internal consistency 
(α = .92) and generally strong psychometric properties with a very large community 
sample (Van Dam & Earleywine, 2011). This measure is considered to be one of the most 
widely used instruments in the field of psychological epidemiology (see Murphy, 2002). 
Big Five Inventory-Neuroticism (BFI-N). The BFI-N contains eight items taken 
from the original BFI (John & Srivastava, 1999). These items were used to assess a 
participant’s trait of Neuroticism. Respondents indicate their agreement to statements 
describing certain personality traits using a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Disagree Strongly; 5 
= Agree Strongly). The BFI-N subscale has demonstrated an internal consistency α of 
.84. It also has had adequate convergent and divergent validity with other common 
personality measures including the Trait Descriptive Adjectives (Goldberg, 1992) and 
NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1992). 
Demographics questionnaire. Respondents were asked to provide basic 
demographic information including their age, gender, and religion. If respondents 
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identified as Christian or Muslim, they were given multiple denominational options to 
select. 
Results 
Academic differences in microaggressions and discrimination. Using 
independent samples t-tests, I found that current university students (M = 17.86, SD = 
8.39) reported significantly higher rates of religious microaggressions than non-students 
(M = 14.84, SD = 6.38), t(357.32) = -3.95, p < .001. The partial eta squared (np2 = .03) 
was of small size (np2 = .01 is small; np2 = .06 is medium, and np2 = .14 is large). The 
Cohen’s d was of medium size (d = .4) (d = .2 is small, d = .5 is medium and d = .8 is 
large). For religious discrimination, current students (M = 40.60, SD = 14.26) also 
reported significantly higher rates of religious discrimination than non-students (M = 
36.39, SD = 13.25), t(310.84) =  -2.87, p < .01, d = .31. These results held even after 
controlling for participants’ age and ethnicity.  
Group differences in microaggressions and discrimination. One important 
distinction in this study population was between Christians, who are part of the national 
religious majority, and non-Christians, who all part of minority religious groups in the 
United States. I conducted independent samples t-tests to examine to what degree these 
groups differed on rates of microaggressions and discrimination. I found that those who 
identified with a minority religion (M = 18.37, SD = 8.76) reported significantly higher 
rates of religious microaggressions than Christians (M = 15.17, SD = 6.61), t(365) =          
-3.99, p < .001, although their experiences of religious discrimination (M = 40.29, SD = 
15.32) only differed marginally from those reported by Christians (M = 37.41, SD = 




Religious Group Differences  
 Religious Microaggressions  Religious Discrimination 
Buddhists (n = 47) 20.78(9.38) 42.68(15.87) 
Christians (n = 201) 15.17(6.61) 37.41 (13.21) 
Hindus (n = 36) 17.61(7.74) 34.33(14.80) 
Jews (n = 31) 14.80 (6.79) 40.00 (14.07) 
Muslims (n = 39) 19.09 (9.75) 42.49 (15.71) 
Note. Means (and standard deviation) are reported for each religious group. The smallest 
sample size for each analysis is reported above.  
Microaggressions, discrimination, and depression. Prior research has 
highlighted the relationship among experiences of discrimination, microaggressions, and 
poorer mental health. Without controlling for any variables, all of the MARIS factors and 
the overall experience of religious microaggressions were related to higher levels of 
depression (see Model 1 in Table 3). I used hierarchical linear regression to examine how 
the overall experience of religious microaggressions uniquely predicts mental health 
outcomes. After controlling for neuroticism and demographic variables (Model 2), I 
found a significant relationship between religious microaggressions and depressive 
symptoms. The significant relationship with depressive symptoms held even after 
controlling for religious discrimination (Model 3), showing that both religious 
microaggressions and religious discrimination uniquely predict depression. 
Table 3 
Incremental Validity of Religious Microaggressions on Depression 
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 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 






MARIS  0.71 .49*** 
 
.61  .42*** 
 
.53  .37*** 
 






































Note. Regression results are presented with and without covariates with standardized and 
unstandardized beta weights for depression and perceived stress. Asterisks indicate 
significance levels (* at p < .05, ** at p < .01, *** at p < .001). In Model 2, I controlled 
for gender (1= male, 2= female), ethnicity (1= European Americans, 2= ethnic 
minorities), and neuroticism. In Model 3, I included religious discrimination in addition 
to the variables controlled in Model 2. 
Study 3 
Method 
Inclusion criteria and participants. For Study 3, I was interested in seeing how 
current university students experience religious bias, and whether there were differences 
in the rates of religious bias inside and outside of the academic context, taking into 
account time spent in each setting. Thus, participants were limited to students attending 
secular universities who reported believing in a God or God(s) or followed a particular 
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religious figure (e.g., Buddha), and self-identified as being religious. Those who failed 
the written attention check question (n = 38) were also excluded. The final mTurk sample 
consisted of 129 participants (57.4% male, 42.6% female) with a mean age of 27.5 years.  
The majority of participants identified as Christians (99.2% Christian; .8% Sunni 
Muslim). Of those who indicated their denomination, the majority of Christians identified 
as Catholics (39.5%), Baptists (17.1%) and those without a denomination (13.2%). The 
sample was somewhat diverse: 63.6% European American; 14.0% African American; 
10.1% Hispanic American; 7% Asian American, Hawaiian or Pacific Islander; 1.6% 
Middle Easterner; 0.8% American Indian or Alaskan Native; and 3.1% chose not to 
answer. The sample consisted of both graduate and undergraduate students (30.2% 
seniors, 27.9% graduate students, 23.3% juniors, 10.9% sophomores, 7% freshman, and 
.8% other) in a variety of disciplines [24.8% in social sciences, 30.2% in non-sciences 
(including law), and 45.0% in STEM fields (including health fields)].  
Measures. 
Religious bias measures. Similar to Study 2, both the MARIS and the GRDS 
were administered. Participants indicated how often they experienced microaggressions 
and discriminatory incidences inside and outside of an academic setting during a typical 
school year. A sum of inside and outside incidences was used to calculate the overall 
rates of religious microaggressions and discrimination. Participants also indicated what 
percentage of time they spent inside versus outside of an academic setting, which was 
used to weight how often religious bias occurred inside and outside of academia. For 
example, a student may indicate a total of ten microaggressions for inside of academia 
and ten incidences outside of academia, and that they spent 40 percent of time inside of 
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academia and 60 percent of time outside. Even though this student had the same total 
number of microaggressive incidences inside and outside of academia, the 
microaggressions experienced inside of academia would be weighted more heavily (i.e., 
it would be calculated as 6 incidences) than microaggressions experienced outside of 
academia (calculated as 4 incidences). This is to take into account that this student spent 
less time inside of academia but yet experienced the same number of microaggressive 
incidences outside of academia. Because of these changes in the number of 
microaggressive incidences, I will only report the p values and effect sizes instead of 
means of microaggressive incidences.  
Depression and neuroticism. The CESD-R was again administered to measure 
depression. Participants indicated depression symptoms they experienced during the past 
week on a 4-point Likert scale (0 = rarely or none of the time; 4 = most or almost all the 
time). The eight-item BFI-N (John & Srivastava, 1999) was again used to measure 
neuroticism.  
Demographics questionnaire. Respondents were again asked to provide basic 
demographic information including their age, gender, and religion. If respondents 
identified as Christian or Muslim, they were given multiple denominational options to 
select. In addition, students were asked about their major and year in school.  
Results 
Academic differences in microaggressions and discrimination. Using pairwise 
t-tests, I found that university students reported experiencing significantly higher rates of 
religious discrimination inside of academia than outside. This was also true for the 
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overall experience of religious microaggressions and for each of the religious 
microaggressions factors (see Table 4).  
Table 4 
Inside and Outside Academia Bias Comparisons 
 t  
value   
p  




Religious Discrimination (n = 128) 3.02 .003 .37  
Religious Microaggressions (n = 129) 3.37 .001 .42  
Assumption of Inferiority (n = 129) 2.97 .004 .35  
Religious Stereotyping (n = 129) 2.92 .004  .33  
Assumption of Non-religiosity (n = 129) 3.39  < .001  .43  
Note. T, p and Cohen’s d values are reported for each pairwise t-tests.   
Group differences. I used univariate ANCOVA controlling for participants’ age 
and ethnicity to examine group differences. Compared to graduate students, 
undergraduates reported experiencing significantly higher rates of religious 
discrimination inside of academia, F(1,119) = 4.72, p = .03, np2 = .04. There were no other 
significant differences between undergraduates and graduate students for their experience 
of religious microaggressions.  
I also found a significant main effect of academic disciplines on the overall 
experience of religious microaggressions, F(2, 118) = 3.17, p < .05, np2 = .05. Using 
simple effects test with Bonferroni correction, I found that social science students 
reported significantly higher rates of religious microaggressions than those in the non-
sciences, p < .05, d = .64. In particular, there was a significant main effect of disciplines 
on Assumption of Non-religiosity, F(2, 118) = 5.41, p < .01, np2 = .08. Using simple 
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effects tests, I found that social science students reported significantly more incidences of 
being assumed to be non-religious than those in the non-sciences, p < .01, d = .75. Social 
science students reported marginally more incidences of being non-religious than those in 
the STEM fields, p < .01, d = .75. In addition, there was a marginally significant effect of 
Assumption of Inferiority, F(2,118) = 2.77, p = .07, np2 = .05. Social science students 
reported significantly more incidences of being assumed to have inferior work than those 
in the non-sciences, p = .03, d = .60. There were no other significant differences among 
different disciplines for participants’ experience of religious discrimination.  
Microaggressions, discrimination, and depression. Using hierarchical linear 
regressions, I examined if religious microaggressions and discrimination would again 
uniquely predict depression. Without controlling for any variables, the overall experience 
of religious microaggressions was related to higher levels of depression (see Model 1 in 
Table 5). After controlling for neuroticism and demographic variables (Model 2), there 
was still a significant relationship between religious microaggressions and depressive 
symptoms. However, the relationship between religious microaggressions and depressive 
symptoms became marginal (p = .09) when religious discrimination was added (Model 
3). Religious discrimination was found not to significantly predict depression.  
Table 5 
Religious Microaggressions and Discrimination in Predicting Depression 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 






MARIS 0.01 .39*** 
 
.00  .26** 
 
.00  .21† 
 








































Note. Regression results are presented with and without covariates with standardized and 
unstandardized beta weights for depression. Symbols indicate significance levels († at p < 
.10, * at p < .05, ** at p < .01, *** at p < .001). In Model 2, I controlled for gender 
(1=male, 2=female), ethnicity (1= European Americans, 2= ethnic minorities), and 
neuroticism. In Model 3, I controlled for religious discrimination in addition to the 
variables controlled in Model 2. 
Discussion 
The main purpose of Studies 2-3 was to examine religious believers’ experience 
of religious microaggressions and discrimination in relation to academia and how these 
experiences affect mental health. Across both studies, I found that religious 
microaggressions and discrimination were more common in the university than outside of 
academia. In Study 2, students reported higher rates of both religious discrimination and 
microaggressions than non-students. In Study 3, university students reported 
encountering significantly more incidences of religious discrimination and 
microaggressions inside of academia than outside. Although the sample in Study 3 was 
not religiously diverse, Study 2 included a large number of religious minorities. Those 
who subscribed to minority religions reported encountering higher incidences of religious 
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microaggressions and discrimination than Christians, suggesting that academia is not a 
safe haven for all religious groups.  
Past studies show that people tend to display prejudice against those who are 
ideologically different from them (e.g., Inbar & Lammers, 2012). Thus, one possible 
explanation for greater encounters with religious bias inside of academia is the tendency 
for professors to be more non-religious. Outside of academia, students may interact more 
with friends and family members who share similar ideologies and backgrounds. This 
may explain why undergraduate students reported experiencing more religious 
discrimination than graduate students as they may have been having more interactions 
with different faculty and students than graduate students.    
In addition, the finding that social science students reported significantly more 
religious microaggressive experiences than those in other disciplines also reflects the 
non-religious demographics of social science faculty. Data on faculty’s religiosity shows 
that social science professors tend to be the least religious faculty group. Social science 
professors have lower rates of belief in God (37.3% believe in the existence of God) than 
those in the physical and biological sciences and the humanities (41.5% for both groups; 
Gross & Simmons, 2009). Although humanities and physical and biological science 
professors have similar levels of belief in God, those in the social sciences are weaker in 
their certainty of the existence of God (24.7%) compared to those in the humanities 
(31.3%; Gross & Simmons, 2009). In addition, the highest number of atheist professors is 
in the social sciences (23.4% in social vs. 16.3% in the humanities), with psychology 
leading with the greatest number of atheist professors (50.0%; Gross & Simmons, 2009). 
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As a result of being more unfamiliar with or rejecting religion, social science faculty may 
enact more subtle religious bias towards students. 
Although this is the case, it is possible that there are higher rates of religious bias 
inside of academia because students have greater numbers of social interactions inside of 
academia than outside. While I took into account time spent inside and outside of 
academia, future studies could also measure base-rate events of bias in both contexts as 
recent critics of microaggressions research have suggested (e.g., Lilienfeld, 2017). In 
addition, future studies should measure other forms of bias alongside religious bias. Past 
studies have found that religious university students document similar rates of religious 
bias as African American university students who report experiencing racial bias (Hyers, 
2007; Hyers & Hyers, 2008). But because this past research did not distinguish between 
biases encountered inside and outside of academia, future studies should measure 
religious bias alongside other forms of bias inside and outside of academia to examine 
whether experiences of religious bias is uniquely higher inside of academia.  
Clinical Implications  
I found that religious microaggressions and discrimination significantly and 
uniquely predicted depressive symptoms in Study 2, and religious microaggressions 
marginally predicted depression in Study 3. The effects were of small to medium size, 
which is consistent with the growing research base showing the negative relationship 
between experiences of prejudice and well being (Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009). One 
of the main limitations of these studies—the present research included—is that these 
findings are correlational in nature, leaving open several (not mutually incompatible) 
causal explanations. For one, the associations may be explained by a third variable 
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causally responsible for both the experience of microaggressions and of depressive 
symptoms. I controlled for possible candidates such as basic demographics and 
neuroticism, but other variables may be involved.  
Another possible causal pathway is that those who are depressed may be more 
likely to interpret neutral interactions as microaggressions. People with depression tend to 
expect and rate their social interactions to be more negative than those without depression 
(Soygüt & Savasir, 2001). If those who are depressed are more likely to feel rejected or to 
negatively interpret events, then comments and behaviors may be more likely to be 
perceived as microaggressive. These microaggressions could then be attributed to 
different aspects of the individual’s identity, such as religion. Furthermore, depression 
could attract negative behavior from others (Joiner, Alfano & Metalsky, 1992), which 
could also be misinterpreted as microaggressive.   
The other causal path is that exposure to religious microaggressions contributes to 
depressive symptom, with the cumulative weight of many microaggressions contributing 
to mental health deficits as prior microaggressions theorists have suggested (Sue, 
Capodilupo, et al., 2007). In fact, the two causal directions could work in concert to 
create a cycle of depression in which microaggressions contribute to poorer mental 
health, which then contribute to a greater likelihood of interpreting and experiencing 
interactions as microaggressive. A better understanding of these potential causal 
pathways is a topic ripe for future research. Experimental manipulation of experiences of 
microaggressions is ethically questionable, but researchers have suggested other 
methodologies such as priming techniques, use of vignettes, and mixed and longitudinal 
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designs to better understand the ways that microaggressions impact individuals (Lau & 
Williams, 2010; Lilienfeld, 2017; Ong & Burrow, 2017).  
Future direction and next phase. The theory of microaggressions is a 
developing field of study, and there have been recent criticisms of how the concept of 
microaggressions is emerging in public discourse (e.g., Campbell & Manning, 2014; 
Etzoni, 2014; Lilienfeld, 2017). Some of these critics have focused on how the concept is 
used to silence healthy debate (e.g., Mac Donald, 2014), whereas others have argued that 
popularizing the concept encourages people to see themselves as fragile (e.g., Lilienfeld, 
2017; Lukianoff & Haidt, 2015). Furthermore, both key microaggressions researchers 
and critics have warned against the frequent misinterpretations and misuses of the 
construct as it has made the leap from academic research to, for instance, university 
policies and political debate (e.g., Haidt, 2017; Zamudio-Suaréz, 2016;). Much of this 
criticism is valid, and people should be cautious in how they cast accusations and seek 
retribution for perceived microaggressions. The social applications of microaggressions 
research should continue to be debated, especially as the constructs continue to 
scientifically mature.  
To summarize, I have thus far found that people generally hold the explicit belief 
that religious individuals are less intelligent but implicitly associate them with 
intelligence. Although I did not directly measure how these people’s explicit and implicit 
associations affect their behavior towards religious believers, I examined experiences of 
overt and subtle forms of religious bias from the perspective of believers. 
Microaggressions is still a developing concept, but it is a form of prejudice that tends to 
rise outside of people’s intentions and conscience, and thus, may be a good proxy to 
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measure the types of prejudice that arise from people’s implicit beliefs. The present study 
found that believers of a variety of faith traditions report encountering both religious 
microaggressions and discrimination. Compared to those outside of the university, 
students reported higher incidences of being perceived to be scholastically inferior, close-
minded and judgmental, and non-religious. These types of experiences relate to poorer 
mental health outcomes, and they may negatively impact religious believers’ sense of 
identity and belonging within academia. As a lack of sense of belonging and perception 
of stereotypes are related to poorer academic adjustment and performance (Steele, 2010; 
Walton & Cohen, 2007; 2011), I will investigate the types of stereotypes that religious 







STUDIES 4-7: SCIENCE STEREOTYPE THREAT  
 
This chapter contains materials from: 
 Rios, K., Cheng, Z.H, Totton, R., & Shariff, A. (2015). Negative stereotypes 
cause Christians to underperform in and disidentify with science. Social Psychological 
and Personality Science, 6, 959-967. doi: 10.1177/1948550615598378.  
Kimberly Rios and Azim Shariff were the principal investigators for these studies. 
Azim Shariff and I primarily designed and conducted Studies 4-5, whereas Kimberly 
Rios led Studies 6-7.  I primarily conducted the analyses and writing for Study 5, and 
gave input to the writings included in this chapter.  
 
Introduction 
A wealth of research on women and ethnic minorities demonstrates the strong 
impact stereotypes have on undermining the academic performance of students in these 
groups (Steele, 2010). In these studies, merely increasing the salience of individuals’ 
membership in a stereotyped group exacerbates their stereotyped behaviors. For example, 
African Americans who are asked to indicate their race prior to completing GRE 
questions will underperform compared to those who do not indicate their ethnicity (Steele 
& Aronson, 1995). Past experiments have also induced underperformance by telling 
participants that their intelligence is being measured or telling female students that math 




Underperformance occurs because these participants are reminded of the 
association between their identity and the associated stereotypes, which can create 
anxiety or “threat.” The discomfort people feel when they are at risk of fulfilling a 
negative stereotype about their group then inhibits their academic performance, an effect 
known as stereotype threat (Steele, 1997; 2010). Not only do stereotype threat decrease 
performance immediately after groups are threatened, but it may also have long-term 
negative consequences for learning. For example, research with women in STEM has 
found that negative stereotypes can inhibit women’s cognitive abilities to learn crucial 
mathematical rules and operations necessary to solve math problems (Rydell, Rydell, & 
Boucher, 2010).  
These groups do not have to be a minority or be part of a disadvantaged group to 
be affected by negative stereotypes. Studies have shown that European Americans, an 
American majority group, are susceptible to underperformance in areas for which there 
are stereotypes about their skills (Aronson et al., 1999; Stone et al., 1999). Stereotypes 
are not only powerful in that they can negatively affect majority and traditionally 
privileged groups, also they do not need to be personally believed by individuals to 
negatively impact them. Indeed, the mere awareness that others endorse these stereotypes 
is sufficient to undermine performance (Steele, 1997).   
If Christians disengage from and underperform in science due to their perception 
of negative stereotypes about Christians and science, these stereotypes may ultimately 
deter them from scientific disciplines and careers, thereby perpetuating the original 
stereotypes. Critically, however, when these negative stereotypes are removed, Christians 
may identify as much with science and perform as well on science-relevant tasks as non-
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Christians, just as women exhibit equivalent scientific identification and performance to 
men when stereotypic cues about gender and science are removed (e.g., Cheryan et al., 
2009; Murphy et al., 2007; Spencer, Steele & Quinn, 1999).  
Current Research 
Across four studies, I will test people’s awareness of negative stereotypes about 
religious groups in science (Studies 4-5), as well as the impact of such stereotypes on 
scientific identification (Study 6) and performance (Study 7). I will start by broadly 
examining stereotypes of different religious groups (Study 4), then focus on Christians 
(Studies 5-7) because of evidence that they tend to be stereotyped as less scientifically 
competent than other religious groups. 
Study 4 (Stereotypes Regarding Different Religious Groups) 
Method 
Participants. Participants (n = 202) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk (mTurk) website. The participants were equally split between genders (51.0% 
females) with a mean age of 34.95 years. The sample was roughly equal between 
Christians and non-Christians (49% Christians). Thirty-three participants were omitted 
for failing a basic attention check item, leaving 169 in the final sample. 
Procedure and Materials. All experimental materials were administered online. 
To investigate the stereotypes that different religious believers may encounter, 
participants were asked to rate the degree to which positive or negative stereotypes 
existed for Christians, Jews, Muslims and atheists (control) in the following domains:  
• that group’s overall competence  
• that group’s competence at science  
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• that group’s trust in science 
• that group’s warmth 
The Likert scale ranged from -3 to +3 with negative numbers indicating a 
negative stereotype (e.g., “less competent than the average person”) and with positive 
numbers indicating a positive stereotype (“more competent than the average person”). A 
score of 0 indicated that neither stereotype exists. The presentation of each of the rated 
groups was randomized to minimize order effects.   
Results  
One sample t-tests revealed that participants perceived Christians to be 
stereotyped as low in scientific competence and trust in science compared to the scale 
midpoint (ps < .001). However, they perceived no stereotype about Christians’ general 
competence (p > .250) and perceived Christians to be stereotyped as high in warmth (p < 
.001), suggesting that the negative stereotypes were specific to science (see Table 6). 
Notably, both Christians (Mcompetence= -.65, SE = 1.66, p < .005; Mtrust = -.92, SE = 1.71, p < 
.001) and non-Christians (Mcompetence = -1.31, SE = 1.30, p < .001; Mtrust = -1.89, SE = 1.26, p < 
.001) recognized the societal stereotypes of Christians as low in competence in and trust 
of science. Jews and Atheists were stereotyped to be competent but cold (ps < .01). 
Muslims were negatively stereotyped across all domains (ps < .001). Paired-samples t-
tests comparing Christians to each of the target groups revealed that Christians were also 
perceived to be stereotyped as lower in scientific competence (ts < -2.75, ps < .001) and 
trust in science (ts < 3.16, ps < .010) than Jews, Muslims, and atheists (see Figure 4).  
Table 6 
Reported Stereotypes of (Non-)Religious Groups 
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Note: Descriptive with means and standard deviations for stereotypes. Symbols indicate 
significance levels († at p < .10, * at p < .05, ** at p < .01, *** at p < .001).  
Figure 4. Reported stereotypes associated with (non-)religious groups. Error bars 
represent standard error of means. 
 
Study 5 (Stereotypes Regarding Different College Students) 
Study 4 found that Christians and Muslims were negatively stereotyped in 
academic domains. Because Muslims were stereotyped negatively across domains, it may 
suggest a general negative attitude or Islamophobia (Nadal, Griffin, Hamit, Leon, Tobio, 


























Christians Atheists Jews Muslims
Stereotypes Christians  Atheists  Jews Muslims 
N = 169 Mean (SD)      
Competence in 
Science 
-1.00 (1.52)*** 1.26 (1.46)*** 0.59 (1.46)*** -0.59 (1.56)*** 
Trust of Science -1.44 (1.56)*** 1.78 (1.47)** .37 (1.45)** -0.98 (1.48)*** 
General 
Competence 
-0.06 (1.46) 0.20 (1.50)† 1.07 (1.41)*** -0.56 (1.41)*** 
Warmth 0.75 (1.64)*** -0.95 (1.56)*** -0.31 (1.52)** -1.49 (1.43)*** 
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Christians make up a large portion of college undergraduates in the United States, anti-
science stereotypes of Christians may have a large impact on American students’ pursuit 
of scientific careers. In Study 5, I examine science stereotypes for Christian college 
students, and compare it to other groups such as female college students who are 
traditionally negatively stereotyped and underrepresented in the sciences. I include 
questions regarding science and non-science subjects to test whether stereotypes 
regarding Christians are specific to the sciences. Although Study 4 found no negative 
stereotypes regarding Christians’ competence, questions regarding general intelligence 
were added to see if I would replicate Study 1’s explicit attitude finding where people 
tended to associate believers with lower intelligence.  
Method 
Participants. Participants (n = 237) from mTurk completed the study. Of those 
participants, 207 students (92 men, 114 female, 1 not reported; 165 undergraduate, 42 
graduate or post bachelor students; Mage = 24.71) passed an attention check question. A 
total of 90 participants self-identified as Christian, whereas 113 self-identified as non-
Christian (4 not reported). 
Procedure and Materials. All experimental materials were identical to the 
previous study except participants were asked to rate stereotypes for atheist, Christian, 
female and male college students in the following domains:  
• that group’s interest in science subjects (e.g. biology, chemistry) 
• that group’s interest in non-science subjects  
• that group’s performance in science subjects 
• that group’s performance in non-science subjects 
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• that group’s competence in science subjects 
• that group’s competence in non- science subjects 
• that group’s general competence  
• that group’s general intelligence  
After indicating their belief in the existence of these stereotypes, participants also 
indicated the degree to which they personally believe any of the stereotypes to be true. 
Results  
Science stereotypes. Descriptive statistics for reported stereotypes associated 
with each group are reported in Table 7. One sample t-tests revealed that participants 
indicated that Christian and female students are stereotyped as being less interested, 
performing worse and being less competent in the sciences, and atheist and male student 
are stereotyped as being more interested, performing better and being more competent in 
the sciences (p < .001 for all t-tests; Table 7). 
Non-science stereotypes. Participants indicated that, in contrast to anti-science 
stereotypes, Christians are stereotyped to be more interested, perform better and be more 
competent in the non-sciences than the average college student (p < .001 for all t-tests; 
Table 7). Participants reported that there are no stereotypes in this domain for atheist 
college students. Participants indicated that female students are stereotyped as being more 
interested, performing better and being more competent in the non-sciences (p < .001 for 
all t-tests). Participants indicated that male students are only stereotyped as less interested 
(p < .001) but not that they are stereotyped as performing worse or being less competent 
in non-science subjects. 
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General intelligence and competence stereotypes. Participants rated that 
Christian students are stereotyped as being less intelligent than an average student (p < 
.01), but they also reported there are no stereotypes regarding general competency for 
Christian students. Participants rated that atheist, female and male students are 
stereotyped as being more intelligent (p < .01 for atheist; p < .05 for female; p < .001 for 
male students) and competent than the average college student (p < .01 for atheist; p < 
.01 for female; p < .001 for male students).  
Table 7 
Reported Stereotypes for College Student Groups 
Note: Descriptive with means and standard deviations for personal beliefs. *Indicates 
significance of p < .05; **indicates significance of p < .01. *** indicates significance of 
p < .001.  
Comparisons between groups for science. In order to probe how Christians and 
atheist students are viewed differently, I conducted pairwise t-tests. Participants indicated 
that Christians are stereotyped as being less interested, performing worse, and being less 
 N = 207 Christians  Atheists  Males Females  
  Mean (SD)      
1. Interest in Sciences -1.09 (1.68)*** 1.52 (1.60)*** 1.31 (1.42)*** -0.86 (1.69)*** 
2. Performance in 
Sciences 
-0.55 (1.49)*** 0.92 (1.57)*** 1.05 (1.51)*** -0.64 (1.58)*** 
3. Competency in 
Sciences 
-0.66 (1.52)*** 1.08 (1.39)*** 1.04 (1.39)*** -0.72 (1.56)*** 
4. Interest in Non-
Sciences 
0.80 (1.43)*** -0.23 (1.49) -0.48 (1.62)*** 1.16 (1.56)*** 
5. Performance in Non-
Sciences 
0.42 (1.29)*** 0.02 (1.29) -0.04 (1.48) 0.86 (1.53)*** 
6. Competency in Non- 
Sciences 
0.36 (1.33)*** 0.02 (1.30) -0.09 (1.43) 0.76 (1.53)*** 
7. General Intelligence -0.28 (1.54)** 0.77 (1.36)** 0.40 (1.33)*** 0.25 (1.41)*  
8. General Competency -0.15 (1.41) 0.49 (1.31)** 0.39 (1.28)*** 0.32 (1.38)** 
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competent in the sciences than atheist students (p < .001 for all pairwise t-tests). In 
regards to the non-sciences, participants indicated that Christian students are associated 
with more interest (p < .001), better performance (p < .01), and more competency (p < 
.02) in the non-sciences than atheist students. Participants also rated that Christians are 
associated with lower intelligence and competence than atheist students (p < .001 for all 
comparisons).  
Consistent with the literature on prejudice against women in the sciences, male 
college students were perceived to be more positively stereotyped than females in terms 
of interest, performance, and competence in the sciences (p < .001 for all comparisons). 
In addition, participants rated that women are positively stereotyped in non-science 
domains (p < .001 for all comparisons). However, participants rated that there are no 
differences in how male and female students are stereotyped in terms of general 
intelligence and competency.  
Notably, however, the levels of perceived anti-science stereotypes of women were 
no different from those perceived to be of Christians. For example, there were no 
significant differences in stereotypes associated with Christian and female students (all p 
> .10) for all the science items. This suggests that the negative stereotypes associated 
with Christians in the sciences are comparable to the stereotypes associated with women. 
All of these comparisons with t-test values and significance are reported in Table 8.  
Table 8 
 
Stereotype Comparisons Between College Groups 
 
Stereotypes about Christians 
versus (N = 207) Atheist Female 
Stereotypes about 
females versus males 
1. Interest in Sciences -14.18*** -1.56 -12.55*** 
2. Performance in Sciences -8.86*** 0.71 -10.97*** 
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3. Competency in Sciences -10.67*** 0.48 -5.54*** 
4. Interest in Non-Sciences 6.47*** -2.81** 9.86*** 
5. Performance in Non-
Sciences 2.81** -3.60*** 9.18*** 
6. Competency in Non- 
Sciences 2.36* -3.17** 5.17*** 
7. General Intelligence -6.29*** -4.19*** -1.06 
8. General Competency -4.32*** -3.92*** -0.53 
Note. T and significance values for group comparison. 
Personal beliefs regarding self: Descriptive statistics for personal beliefs in 
these stereotypes regarding Christians and women are reported in Table 9. Christians and 
women did not personally believe that they are worse in the sciences, (p < .001 for all 
comparisons) and female students indicated that they personally believe that women are 
more competent in the sciences than an average college student (p < .03). Both groups 
also indicated that they personally believe they are more intelligent, more competent, and 
better at the non-sciences than an average college student (p < .001 for all comparisons).  
Outgroup personal beliefs: Non-Christians indicated that they personally believe 
that Christians are less interested, less competent and worse performing in science 
subjects as well as less intelligent and competent overall (p < .001 for all comparisons). 
They believed that Christians are more interested in non-science subjects than the average 
student (p < .01), but did not report believing that Christians are more competent or better 
performing at these subjects (p > .10). In addition, non-Christians reported that they 
believed Christian students to be less intelligence and competent than the average college 
student (p < .001; see Table 9).  
Contrary to the general anti-outgroup bias found above, Christians reported that 
they personally believe atheist college students are more interested, competent, better 
performing in the sciences and are more intelligent than the average student (p < .001 for 
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all comparisons). They did not personally believe atheist students differed from the 
average college student in the non-sciences or in terms of general competence. Male 
participants reported that they personally perceive female students to be more intelligent 
and competent than the average college student (p < .001 for all comparisons). Men also 
believed that women are more interested, competent and better performing in non-science 
subjects (p < .001 for all comparisons). Finally, men did not report believing that women 
differ from the average student in terms of their interest, performance, or competence in 
science subjects.  
These results suggest that either people personally hold more negative beliefs 
about Christians than about women, or that they are more willing to indicate their 
negative personal beliefs about Christians than female college students. In addition, it 
highlights that people’s personal negative beliefs about Christians are unique to the 
sciences and intelligence, and are not a mere product of an anti-outgroup bias as 
Christians do not report the same anti-science beliefs regarding atheist students nor do 
men towards female students. 
Table 9 














(N = 90) 
Males about 
females (N = 
92) 
1. Sciences Interest -0.08 (1.57) 0.00 (1.45) -0.86 (1.43)*** 1.14 (1.48)*** 0.00 (1.59) 
2. Sciences 
Performance 
0.08 (1.52) 0.17 (1.34) -0.45 (1.28)*** .69 (1.18)*** 0.03 (1.49) 
3. Science 
Competency 
0.23 (1.35) 0.26 (1.26)* -0.59 (1.26)*** .71(1.23)*** 0.24 (1.57) 
4. Non-Sciences 
Interest 
0.92 (1.26)*** 0.99 (1.19)*** 0.36 (1.41)** -0.06 (1.43) 0.75(1.37)*** 
5. Non-Sciences 0.79 (1.14)*** 0.75 (1.20)*** 0.16 (1.13) -0.11 (1.46) 0.77 (1.34)*** 
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Note: Descriptive with means and standard deviations for personal beliefs. *indicates 
significance of p < .05; **indicates significance of p < .01. *** indicates significance of 
p < .001. We do not report significant associations for those below the Bonferroni 
corrected value.  
Study 6 (Stereotypes Threat and Science Interest) 
Study 5 found that negative stereotypes regarding Christians are domain specific, 
where Christians are perceived to have lower interests and abilities in the sciences but not 
in non-science subjects. These stereotypes are comparable to the negative stereotypes 
about women in the sciences although people report not personally believing in the 
stereotypes associated with women. Non-Christians personally believe Christians are 
inferior at, and are uninterested in science, suggesting the stereotypes are both pervasive 
and socially acceptable. In Study 6, I will test the possibility that these stereotypes may 
influence Christian college students’ own feelings about science, just as women’s and 
minorities’ feelings about science can be affected by stereotypes about their groups 
(Cheryan et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2007). 
Method 
Participants. One hundred undergraduate college students (39 men, 61 women; 
Mage = 19.36, 62 Christians, 35 non-Christians, 3 unspecified) completed a laboratory study 
for credit. Participants reported their religious affiliation in a pre-screening survey. Three 
Performance 
6. Non- Sciences 
Competency  
0.67 (1.14)*** 0.67 (1.27)*** -0.11 (1.14) -0.06 (1.15) 0.66 (1.38)*** 
7. General 
Intelligence 
0.64 (1.17)*** 0.60 (1.25)*** -0.62 (1.32)*** .28(1.11)* 0.60 (1.45)*** 
8. General 
Competency 
0.58 (1.25)*** 0.51 (1.33)*** -0.49 (1.26)*** .07(1.11) 0.61 (1.41)*** 
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participants who suspected that the news article was not real and three participants whose 
religious affiliation was unspecified were dropped from analyses, as was one outlier with 
an extreme Cook’s D score of .10 (5 SD above the mean). The remaining 93 participants 
were randomly assigned to the high-threat (n = 34), low-threat (n = 28), or no article (n = 
31) condition. 
Procedure and Materials. The study was described as assessing the relationship 
between identity, interests, and abilities. Participants in the threat conditions first read an 
article allegedly published by the local newspaper, presented as “background 
information.” The article described the results of a bogus poll suggesting that most 
students at the university (78%) believed Christians were bad (or good) at science. 
Participants in the no article condition received the dependent measures without reading 
an article.  
Next, participants completed a 20-item self-reported measure of their interest in 
and aptitude for scientific reasoning and problem solving, adapted from Marsh and 
O’Neil (1984). Example items include “I would have no interest in being an inventor” 
(reverse-coded) and “I am quite good at science.” Participants responded on a 7-point 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), and their responses were averaged into 
a composite (M = 4.38, SD = .82; α = .87). Finally, participants were probed for 
suspicion and debriefed. 
Results  
 A 3 (condition: high-threat versus low-threat versus no article) X 2 (religious 
identity: Christian versus non-Christian) ANOVA revealed that Christian students (M = 
4.26, 95% CI: 4.06-4.46) reported weaker identification with science than did non-
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Christians overall (M = 4.67, 95% CI: 4.41-4.94), F(1, 87) = 6.19, p = .015, ηρ2 = .07. 
However, this main effect was qualified by a two-way interaction, F(2, 87) = 3.59, p = 
.032, ηρ2 = .08. Simple effects tests indicated that in the high-threat condition, Christians 
(M = 3.98, 95% CI: 3.67-4.30) identified significantly less with science than non-
Christian students (M = 4.80, 95% CI: 4.34-5.26), F(1, 87) = 8.55, p = .004, ηρ2 = .09. 
This difference also emerged in the control condition (Christians: M = 4.08, 95% CI: 
3.73-4.43; non-Christians: M = 4.72, 95% CI: 4.28-5.16), F(1, 87) = 5.21, p = .025, ηρ2 = 
.06. In the low-threat condition, there was no significant difference between Christians 
(M=4.72, 95% CI: 4.28-5.16) and non-Christians (M = 4.50, 95% CI: 4.02-4.97), F(1, 87) 
= .46, p > .250, ηρ2 = .01 (see Figure 5).  
 

































Study 6 suggests that Christian college students’ science interest and 
identification tend to suffer unless the anti-science stereotype is explicitly removed – that 
is, unless Christians are given information suggesting that they are just as competent in 
science as other groups. Perhaps because of the social acceptability of expressing 
negative stereotypes about Christians in science (as demonstrated in Study 5), Christians 
may experience a default state of feeling that science is incompatible with their religious 
identity, similar to low-SES students in higher education (Stephens, Fryberg, Markus, 
Johnson & Covarrubias, 2012). Notably, however, Christian college students express as 
much interest in science as non-Christians when reassured that others do not endorse the 
negative stereotypes.  
Study 7 tests the consequences of these stereotypes for Christians’ academic 
performance in science. If stereotypes compromise Christians’ scientific abilities in 
everyday college contexts, then mere contextual cues relevant to science should also 
trigger underperformance (Cheryan et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2007). Moreover, because 
the impact of negative stereotypes is strongest among highly-identified group members 
(whose group membership is important to their self-concept; Schmader, 2002), religiosity 
should moderate the effects of such cues.  
Method 
 Participants. One hundred and seven college students (43 men, 64 women; Mage = 
20.88) participated in exchange for partial course credit. To be eligible for the study, 
participants must have completed a pre-screening survey at least one week before the 
experiment. Thirty-nine participants self-identified as Christian, whereas 64 participants 
self-identified as non-Christian. Four participants did not specify their religious 
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affiliation, so they were dropped from analyses. Additionally, eleven participants were 
omitted due to suspicion, and two statistical outliers were excluded because their Cook’s 
D scores (.15 and .16) were more than 5 SD above the sample mean. The final sample 
thus consisted of 90 individuals.  
 Procedure and Materials. After signing up, but no less than one week prior to 
the study, participants were sent a link to the pre-screening survey. In addition to the 
demographic and religious affiliation questions, the survey included Preston and Epley’s 
(2005) 5-item Belief in God scale as a measure of religiosity (e.g., “What is the general 
importance of God in your life?”). Participants responded on 11-point scales (1 = not at 
all, 11 = extremely), and their responses were averaged.  
  The day before the study, the experimenter emailed participants to tell them that 
there was not enough space in the Psychology Department to hold sessions, and that 
(depending on experimental condition) they would take the study in either the Divinity 
School (a less threatening context for Christians; n = 47) or the Physical Sciences 
building (a more threatening context for Christians; n = 43). To increase awareness of the 
context, upon arrival to their assigned building, all participants read an adapted mission 
statement of the relevant department and were asked to evaluate it on dimensions such as 
clarity and quality of writing.  
In reality, the mission statement was intended to strengthen the manipulation, and 
to either imply (Divinity School condition) or not imply (Physical Sciences condition) 
that science and religion could be considered compatible. In the Divinity School 
condition, it contained phrases indicating that many of the school’s faculty members hold 
joint appointments in departments such as Medicine, Law, and Anthropology, and that 
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the school believes ideas should be “subject to uncompromising standards of argument 
and evidence.”  In the Physical Sciences condition, it contained references to the number 
of Nobel Prizes awarded to the faculty, and the joint appointments that the division’s 
faculty members hold at local research institutions.  
Next, participants completed a measure described as a logical reasoning test, 
which consisted of ten questions from the former GRE analytical section (e.g., “David 
ranks seventh from the top and 28th from the bottom in a class. How many students are 
there in the class?” (a) 36, (b) 35, (c) 34, (d) cannot be determined, (e) none of the above; 
M=5.31, SD=1.53) to create a performance score for each participant (M = 5.31, SD = 
1.53). Finally, participants were probed for suspicion and fully debriefed. 
Results  
Because Christians (M = 7.32, SD = 2.73 on an 11-point scale) and non-Christians 
(M = 2.74, SD = 1.96) differed significantly in religiosity, t(101) = -9.88, p < .001, data 
was analyzed as two separate location (0 = Physical Sciences, 1 = Divinity School) x 
religiosity (mean-centered) interactions for Christians and non-Christians, using multiple 
regression (Aiken & West, 1991). A two-way threat context X religiosity multiple 
regression was significant for Christians (b = .72, SE = .17), t(28) = 4.34, p < .001, but 
not for non-Christians (p > .250; see Figure 6). Among Christians, religiosity correlated 
negatively with performance in the high-threat context (b = -.63, SE = .14, t (28) = -4.45, 
p < .001), and was uncorrelated with performance in the low-threat context, b = .09, SE = 
.09, t(28) = 1.03, p > .250 (see Figure 6). 
Figure 6. Correct solutions as a function of Christian identity, threat context, and 








Study 7 showed that mere contextual cues relevant to science could trigger 
underperformance in religious students (Cheryan et al., 2009; Murphy et al., 2007). 
Because religiosity correlated negatively with performance in the high-threat context, 
these results suggest that the impact of negative stereotypes is strongest among highly 
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identified group members (whose group membership is important to their self-concept; 
Schmader, 2002).  
General Discussion 
These studies overall demonstrate that increasing the salience of pervasive anti-
science stereotypes about Christians (Studies 4 and 5) can lead them to disidentify with 
science (Study 6), and to underperform on scientific tasks especially for the highly 
religious (Study 7). In Study 4 and 5, I found that these stereotypes are specific to 
competence and trust in science, and do not extend to general competence or non-science 
subjects. Study 6 demonstrated that increasing the awareness of these negative 
stereotypes about Christians in science can lead Christians to become less interested in 
science. Study 7 showed that mere contextual cues could prime Christians to 
underperform on science-relevant tasks, especially among those who are highly religious. 
The effect sizes of Study 6 and 7 are of medium to large size, demonstrating that the 
overall effects of these stereotypes are harmful and consequential. As with other 
stereotyped groups, Christians may face a perpetuating cycle whereby they underperform 
due to the existing stereotypes, thereby confirming those original stereotypes. Together, 
these four studies highlight the existence—and reveal the cost—of pervasive negative 
stereotypes about Christians’ ability in science.  
In regards to the mechanisms leading to disidentification and underperformance, 
Study 5 demonstrated that Christians did not personally endorse anti-science stereotypes 
about their group, despite their awareness of the existence of such stereotypes. It is 
possible that Christians may disidentify with science perceived not to “match” their 
religious identity because 1) they believe that others stereotype them as not belonging in 
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science (Steele et al., 2002; Stephens et al., 2012); 2) because they believe their religious 
values are incompatible with science (see Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002); 3) 
because they believe they will fare better in the non-sciences (Study 5); or 4) other 
groups fare better in the sciences (Study 5). However, Study 5 demonstrates that it is 
unlikely that self-stereotyping is the only reason behind Christians’ underperformance as 
they do not personally believe that they are bad at science. Rather, Christians’ anxiety 
about confirming the negative stereotypes could undermine their performance, 
engagement, and interest in science similar to how researchers have proposed this be true 
for other groups such as women and ethnic minorities (Steele & Aronson, 1995).  
However, unlike women and ethnic minorities, on whom much research about 
negative intellectual stereotypes has focused, American Christians are a dominant 
majority group (75% of the population; Gallup, 2015), and not one generally perceived as 
disadvantaged. Yet, context matters; in academic and scientific domains, different 
proportions of religious believers and a potentially very different climate exist. Christian 
underrepresentation in science may be caused by self-selection (choosing not to enter 
science-related fields), underperformance (not succeeding in said fields), and potentially 
biased behaviors from others, all of which are exacerbated by negative stereotypes. 
Because Christians constitute such a large proportion of the U.S. population, 
discouraging their participation in scientific disciplines may vastly impact the potential 
flow of students into science-related careers. Diagnosing such barriers is a critical step in 





IMPLICATIONS FOR DIVERSITY IN ACADEMIA AND SCIENCE FIELDS 
The main focus of this dissertation was to investigate people’s attitudes toward 
religious individuals, and how these attitudes affect the mental health and academic 
performance of these individuals. Study 1 found that participants tended to explicitly 
report associating religious believers with lower intelligence, but to implicitly associate 
them with higher intelligence. Studies 2-3 showed that religious believers of diverse 
backgrounds reported experiencing overt and covert forms of religious bias, including 
ones related to their academic ability. Finally, Studies 4-7 demonstrated that Christians in 
particular are stereotyped to have lower competency in science, which causes them to 
disidentify with and underperform in science relevant tasks.  
The Academic and Science Context 
There was evidence across multiple studies that a bias against religious 
individuals tended to be more prevalent in secular academic institutions. In Study 1, 
faculty and students from secular universities perceived all non-religious target groups to 
have higher intelligence than the religious target. In addition, they were significantly 
more likely than students and faculty from a religiously affiliated university to associate 
religiosity with lower intelligence. Although people implicitly associated religion with 
intelligence, faculty and students from secular institutions were less likely to do so 
compared to those from religiously affiliated universities. In addition, faculty members, 
particularly those from secular institutions, did not have an implicit association between 
religion and intelligence and had the strongest congruity between their explicit and 
implicit intelligence preference. 
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In Studies 2-3, religious believers reported that they encountered more incidences 
of overt and covert forms of religious bias inside of higher education than outside of 
academia. Specifically, university students reported that they felt they were more likely to 
be assumed to possess less scholastic ability and achievements inside an academic 
context than outside. Experiences of religious microaggressions significantly predicted 
higher rates of depression in Study 2 and marginally in Study 3.  
Study 4 found that compared to other religious groups, people perceived 
Christians to lack science competency. Study 5 demonstrated that these stereotypes 
applied to Christian college students and was at a comparable rate to how women are 
stereotyped to have a lack scientific competency and interest. Study 5 also showed that 
Christians were perceived to be less interested in and to have inferior ability in the 
sciences specifically; they were stereotyped to be more interested in the non-sciences and 
were not stereotyped to lack general competency. Finally, Study 6 and 7 demonstrated 
that these negative stereotypes cause Christian college students to become less interested 
in and identify less with science, as well as underperform on science relevant tasks.                            
College is a crucial turning point for many groups’ pursuit of academic and 
scientific careers. For example, African Americans, Latinos, and women who begin 
college with science aspirations are less likely to persist in science fields than their male 
and Asian American counterparts, making college one of the earlier key exit points from 
scientific careers (Moss-Racusin, Dovidio, Brescoll, Graham & Handelsman, 2012). For 
religious college students, data shows that 74.2% of college students reported believing in 
the existence of God [Higher Education Research Institute (HERI), 2007) and about 
72.5% of college students have a religious affiliation (HERI, 2014). Religious students 
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enter science majors at the same rate as secular students [(American Religious Identity 
Survey (ARIS), 2013]. Majors in science, technology, engineering and mathematics 
(STEM) were by far the most popular for religious believers (40% vs. 27% in social 
sciences, 27% in humanities, and 5% in other). If STEM and social science majors are 
combined, then the majority of religious college students (67%) major in some form of 
the sciences (ARIS, 2013). These suggest that a high percentage of religious students are 
initially interested in science. In addition, the percentage and number of religious students 
majoring in the sciences are similar to (and slightly higher than) those of secular students. 
Religious students (40%) are majoring in STEM at a slightly higher rate than secular 
students (38%), and secular students are majoring in the social sciences (29%) and 
humanities (30%) at a slightly higher rate than religious students (27% in social sciences 
and 27% in the humanities; ARIS). 
Despite religious believers being a large proportion of the college student 
populations and a large percentage of these believers majoring in the sciences, there are 
relatively few religious individuals who ultimately enter the academic and scientific 
professions (see Figure 7). Professors and scientists, particularly natural and social 
science faculty members at elite universities, identify as being less religious and more 
non-religious than the general American population (Ecklund & Scheitle, 2007; Gross & 
Simmons, 2009; Pew Research Center, 2009). Among scientists, there is a substantial 
decrease in religiosity where only about a third of scientists belonging to the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), the world’s largest general 
scientific society, believe in the existence of God (Pew Research Center, 2009).  




My dissertation shows that part of the reason there may be a leaky pipeline for 
religious believers in academia and science is due to bias and negative stereotypes. 
Religious students in the sciences may be underperforming due to stereotype threat, 
which then will appear to confirm the stereotypes about their competence. Because 
perceptions of personal performance are a strong predictor of success and retention in 
academic fields (Ehrlinger & Dunning, 2003), religious believers may discontinue and 
self-select out of the sciences if they perceive themselves doing poorly in the sciences. 
Implications In Light of Research with Women and Ethnic Minorities  
Research conducted on women and ethnic minorities may offer insight into the 
psychological factors affecting religious believers’ representation and trajectory in 
academia and the sciences. Although this is the case, it is important to acknowledge 
several ways in which religious believers are different from ethnic minorities and women. 
One, religious believers as a whole belong to a privileged group in America, and atheists 
face a high level of prejudice in America (e.g. Gervais et al., 2011). Some religious 
minorities like Muslims face a high level of discrimination in society, but in general, 
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religious individuals as a group enjoy certain privileges; thus, they face fewer or different 
barriers than traditionally disadvantaged groups.  
In addition, although genetics influence religiosity and some people are identified 
with their family’s religion (Koenig, McGrue, Krueger, & Bouchard, 2005), religious 
identity is more fluid than one’s race or sex (although ethnic and gender identity can 
change). This poses some limitations and makes the issue of the lack of religious 
believers in science more complex. For example, similar rates of religious and secular 
college students are majoring in STEM and in the social sciences (ARIS, 2013), but there 
are substantially fewer religious science faculty and professionals.  
Is the underrepresentation of religious believers in science accounted for by 
religious believers never entering scientific careers post college, religious believers 
becoming non-religious as they continue their scientific training, or religious believer not 
continuing with science positions after advanced training? There has been little research 
examining and differentiating among these potential reasons. These factors may be 
particularly challenging to tease apart given that one’s religion is not as fixed as one’s 
race and sex.  
Another difference between religion and other demographics is that religion is 
based on a system of beliefs. This may pose some unique challenges for religious 
individuals because some religious teachings are held up as truths, thus religious 
individuals would have to reconcile or work around claims that may contradict scientific 
findings. In addition, one’s religion is more concealable than one’s gender or race. It is 
possible that this may buffer believers against some discrimination because religious 
individuals have more control over who finds out about their religious identity, or they 
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may experience more overt forms of bias, as other people are not aware (and thus less 
likely to filter) what they say about religious individuals.  
Although religion has more similarities with political orientation (e.g., both 
having to do with viewpoint diversity) than with race or gender, research on political 
diversity and discrimination are only emerging (Duarte et al., 2015; Inbar & Lammers, 
2012). Thus, despite the limitations of comparing religion with gender and race, research 
conducted with women and ethnic minorities may offer the best available research to 
understand the factors and solutions to the lack of religious believers in science. Despite 
the fluidity of religion and its ability to be concealed, the salience of one’s religion and 
the impact religion on an individual can be just as important as one’s gender or race. 
Religious beliefs and practices are personally chosen and influence people’s notions of 
meaning, morality, and significance, which means one’s religious identity may be just as 
important as one’s racial or gender identity in influencing one’s concept of self, abilities, 
and direction in life (Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008; Pargament, Magyar, Russell & 
Murray; Swank, 2005; Park, 2005).  
Drawing from research with women and ethnic minorities, there are several 
reasons why social identities, such as one’s religion, can impact one’s academics and 
interests (Cohen & Garcia, 2008). According to Cohen and Garcia’s (2008) Identity 
Engagement Model, people are vigilant for situational cues for whether or not they will 
be treated negatively or perform poorly because of their social identity. Previous research 
shows that stereotyped individuals like women and ethnic minorities are aware of cues 
indicating whether or not they belong to science, and feedback can be interpreted 
negatively as evidence that they do not belong (Dasgupta, 2011; Smith, Lewis, 
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Hawthorne & Hodges, 2012; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002). When stereotyped 
individuals’ social identity is threatened and they do not think they have the resources to 
cope with the threat, the threat may lead to lower interest and engagement (Cohen & 
Garcia, 2008). For example, women who are exposed to gender stereotypes are also less 
likely to answer math questions and focus more on verbal questions (Davies, Spencer, 
Quinn, & Gerhardstein, 2002), suggesting a tendency to disengage and disidentify with 
subjects that they are negatively stereotyped in.   
This is congruent with Study 6’s findings, where Christian college students’ 
reported interest in science dropped below those of non-Christians when they read that 
others thought Christians lacked science competency. But after Christians were told that 
others perceive them to be good at science, their interest in science was at the same level 
as non-Christians’ interest. Because religious believers, in particular Christians, are 
stereotyped to be less competent and interested in science, they may be vigilant for 
threatening cues in science contexts as other stereotyped groups have been shown to do. 
If they detect threats, experience hardships in science classes, or do not feel like they 
belong academically, then they may question their suitability for academia and science. 
This can deter religious believers from becoming interested in and entering science, and 
lead them to self-select out of what they might perceive to be a potentially hostile and 
isolating field that does not “match” their identity. 
My dissertation also found that religious believers were assumed to be inferior in 
their academic and scholastic achievements (Studies 2-3) and were stereotyped to be less 
intelligent than the average college student (Study 5). This suggests that religious 
students may question their academic or intellectual belonging and may underperform in 
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domains outside of science due to general stereotypes about their intelligence. Future 
studies should explore this possibility as this may contribute to religious believers’ 
underrepresentation in academia and lower intelligence test performance (Zuckerman et 
al., 2013).  
Religious students’ underperformance not only affects religious individuals’ view 
of themselves, but also affects their professors’ and employers’ beliefs about religious 
individuals’ abilities to conduct science. My dissertation generally found that religiosity 
is associated with lower intelligence, and non-religious individuals both perceive and 
personally endorse anti-science stereotypes about religious believers. If professors or 
employers know the religious identity of their students or employees, and these religious 
individuals underperform due to anxiety about confirming negative stereotypes about 
their scientific competence, then this may confirm the pre-existing beliefs about religious 
individuals’ abilities to perform in science. Overall, underperformance in science can 
confirm stereotypes about religious believers’ scientific abilities, which diminishes their 
likelihood of pursuing science-related disciplines and careers. 
 While people may self-select out of academic and science disciplines, factors 
such as bias and discrimination can push groups out of the academic and science pipeline. 
For example, research show that both students and faculty are more willing to hire male 
applicants than women for science lab manager positions or a position that requires math 
(Moss-Racusin, van der Toorn, Dovidio, Brescoll, & Handelsman, 2014; Reuben, 
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2014). Another study found that people are more willing to hire 
men than women for a position that required math performance even when they were 
provided with information about equal past math performance of applicants (Reuben et 
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al., 2014). Further, ethnic minorities are less likely than European Americans to receive 
National Institute of Health funding even after controlling for key variables such as 
educational background, research productivity, and awards (Ginther et al., 2011). Last, 
academics reported that they would be more biased against conservatives in faculty hires, 
symposium invitations, and journal and grant review (Inbar & Lammers, 2012).  
Prior studies and this dissertation have documented people’s reported negative 
attitudes or willingness to discriminate against religious believers (Yancey, 2011), and 
religious believers’ report of experiencing prejudice in academia (e.g., Hodge, 2006; 
Hyers & Hyers, 2008; Yancey, 2011). However, only one study has experimentally 
demonstrated that people act upon their negative beliefs about religious believers. Gartner 
(1986) found that professors were more likely to negatively evaluate graduate school 
applicants who were religious than those who had no mention of religion on their 
application (and otherwise was identical to the religious applicant). As that study is over 
3 decades old (and academia has become increasingly secular), future research should 
update and experimentally investigate how people’s reported negative perceptions about 
religious believers’ academic and scientific abilities may bias their treatment towards this 
group.  
Psychological Interventions to Increase Representation 
Academic interventions and strategies to lessen the achievement gap experienced 
by ethnic minorities, first-generation, and female college students may provide insight 
into how to increase religious believers’ participation and performance in academia and 
science. Previous research shows that exposure to certain role models who belong to the 
stereotyped group (Marx & Goff, 2005; Marx & Roman, 2002), affirmation of important 
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personal values (Cook, Purdie-Vaughns, Garcia, & Cohen, 2012; Miyake et al., 2010) 
and increasing a sense of belonging (Walton & Cohen, 2007; 2011) can help mitigate the 
negative effects of stereotype threat. For example, when participants have a competent in-
group experimenter, women and black college students performed better on diagnostic 
tests than those who did not have an experimenter who shared the same background 
(Marx & Goff, 2005; Marx & Roman, 2002). In addition, women who are exposed to 
successful women in STEM performed better on diagnostic math tests although exposure 
to stereotypical role models (e.g., geeky females in computer science) can have negative 
effects (Cheryan, Siy, Vichayapai, Drury, & Kim, 2011; Marx, Stapel, & Muller, 2005; 
McIntyre, Paulson, & Lord, 2003). New research examining the outcome of exposure to 
prominent religious or atheist scientists shows people are more likely to take a 
collaborative view of science and religion after learning about a high-profile scientist 
who believes in the compatibility between religious and science (Scheitle & Ecklund, 
2017). Future research can examine whether exposure to such religious scientists can 
positively affect religious students’ engagement, ability, understanding and practice of 
science. 
Self-affirmation involves reflecting on important aspects of one’s life or engaging 
in an activity that makes salient important values that are not related to the stereotyped 
domain (Miyake et al., 2010). Value affirmation interventions are sought to be effective 
and buffer against psychological threat because they are able to help those who are facing 
stereotype threat to reestablish a sense of personal worth, and to gain internal resources 
necessary for coping with a threatening environment (Miyake et al., 2010). Studies show 
that women who affirmed a valued trait performed better than women who were in the 
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control or stereotype threat condition (Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006). 
African American and Latino students who completed one or multiple self-affirming 
exercises had better grades than those in the neutral/control condition (Cohen, Garcia, 
Apfel, & Master, 2006; Sherman et al., 2013), while European American students’ grades 
were unaffected by these value affirming exercises.  
 A recent experimental study demonstrates that the effectiveness of the 
intervention depends on the threatened target (Shapiro, Williams, & Hambarchyan, 
2013). Group-as-target stereotype threat occurs when people worry that their 
performance will reflect badly on the stereotyped group as a whole. These are concerns 
about being a bad ambassador for the group (e.g., a woman being concerned that her 
potential performance on a science task proves that all women are less competent in 
science). Self-as-target stereotype threats, on the other hand, are concerns about how 
being members of a stereotyped group can affect people’s perception about their 
individual performance. These are concerns about being personally judged on the basis of 
existing stereotypes (e.g., a woman being concerned that her performance on a science 
task proves that she as a woman is less competent in the sciences). Shapiro and 
colleagues (2013) found that for African American and female students, role model 
interventions were only effective in targeting group-as-target stereotype threats while 
value affirmation interventions were successful in buffering against self-as-target 
stereotype threats. Depending on how religious students experience stereotype threat 
(group vs. self vs. both), being exposed to role models who are in the sciences and having 
students affirm their own values may be effective interventions. 
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Although interventions that have been effective with these traditionally 
disadvantaged groups may also be successful with religious students, there may be some 
modifications and tailoring that needs to be done for religious students as they differ from 
these groups in some aspects. For example, brief psychological interventions to help 
ethnic minority students feel a greater sense of belonging in universities have reduced the 
effects of stereotype threat on academic performance and health (Walton & Cohen, 2007; 
2011). Recently, researchers started to differentiate between different types of belonging 
uncertainty where certain groups may experience a lack of belonging in specific domains 
(Lewis & Hodges, 2015). For example, ethnic minority college students and first 
generation college students may be underrepresented both academically and socially, thus 
social belonging interventions may be particularly effective for them (Stephens, 
Hamedani, & Destin, 2014; Walton & Cohen, 2007; 2011). Women, because they tend to 
make up the majority of college students, may only feel excluded or uncertain in their 
abilities in STEM fields (Aud et al, 2011; Lewis & Hodges, 2015). Therefore, 
interventions may vary depending on the unique needs of the group. 
Religious college students may also feel isolated in different ways from ethnic 
minority and first-generation students. Religious college students, as they make up a 
substantial population of the college student body, may not struggle with feeling a sense 
of social belonging or finding peers with similar interests as much as they may feel 
excluded academically or in science fields. Prior studies highlight how religious believers 
feel that professors demean their religious identity, and are excluded in the academic 
discourse (Hyers & Hyers, 2008). Christians face negative stereotypes about their 
intelligence and science competencies, thus they may face uncertainties in academia in 
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general, and in science in particular. Future belonging interventions targeting religious 
believers may need to be tailored so that religious believers feel accepted academically or 
in the sciences.  
The lack of religious believers in academic and scientific disciplines has negative 
consequences for the science participation of Americans and the advancement of science. 
Americans are less likely to pursue scientific careers than careers in other fields, and have 
lower science literacy scores compared to citizens of many Asian and European countries 
(Moss-Racusin et al., 2014; National Center for Educational Statistics, 2012). Low 
science participation and literacy are problematic because scientific advances are central 
to societal competitiveness and flourishing due to their influence on public policy, 
medical and technological advances, and innovations (Press & Leshner, 2013). Studies 
show that financial investment into basic science yields an annual return rate of 20-60% 
on such investments (Press & Leshner, 2013). 
Decades of research and advocacies have focused on increasing ethnic minorities’ 
and women’s participation in academia and in the sciences (Ginther et al., 2011; Moss-
Racusin et al., 2012; Reuben et al., 2014). They have led to an increase in their 
participation, although much more work is needed to bring them to equality with 
European Americans and men in science (Kessel & Nelson, 2011). There has been 
limited attention and research on the lack of religious believers in science, but 
psychological research and interventions conducted with ethnic minorities’ and women’s 
participation can provide the blueprint for what can be done to increase religious 
believers’ performance and representation in science, and to understand why they are 
underrepresented in and not pursuing the sciences. The factors contributing to the lack of 
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religious believers in the sciences are cyclical, but intervening in just one area may lead 
to positive ripple effects.  
In addition, because women and ethnic minorities tend to have stronger religious 
identities than European American males (Pew Research Center, 2009; Sherkat, 2007), 
addressing the underrepresentation of religious believers may be an additional way to 
increase these other underrepresented groups’ participation in the sciences. Research on 
strategies to increase religious individuals in science can also inform interventions and 
strategies to increase the women and ethnic minorities in science. Overall, remedying the 
pathways contributing to the lack of religious believers in academia and science can 
encourage a substantial percentage of the population to become more involved in the 







































THE MICROAGGRESSIONS AGAINST RELIGIOUS BELIEVERS SCALE (MARIS) 
 
Factor 1: Assumption of Inferiority  
1. Others are surprised at my professional success because of my religion.    
2. Others are surprised at my scholastic success because of my religion.    
3. Others have assumed I am less educated because of my religious identity.    
4. Others have assumed that my work would be inferior because of my religion.    
Factor 2: Religious Stereotyping  
1. Others have assumed I am homophobic because of my religion.  
2. Others have assumed I am close-minded because of my religion. 
3. Others have assumed that I am judging them because of my religion.  
Factor 3: Assumption of Non-religiosity  
1. Others have assumed that I do not believe in God or Gods. 
2. Others acted surprised that I do believe in God or Gods. 
3. Others have assumed that I do not attend places of worship without first asking if I identify 
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